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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this research is to develop a standardized Information Asset 
Valuation (IAV) methodology.  The IAV methodology proposes that accurate valuation 
for an Information Asset (InfoA) is the convergence of information tangible, intangible, 
and flow attributes to form a functional entity that enhances mission capability.  The IAV 
model attempts to quantify an InfoA to a single value through the summation of weighted 
criteria.  Standardizing the InfoA value criteria will enable decision makers to compare-
atively analyze dissimilar InfoAs across the tactical, operational, and strategic domains.  
This research develops the IAV methodology through a review of existing military and 
non-military valuation methodologies.  IAV provides the Air Force (AF) and Department 
of Defense (DoD) with a standardized methodology that may be utilized enterprise wide 
when conducting risk and damage assessment and risk management.  The IAV 
methodology is one of the key functions necessary for the Cyber Incident Mission Impact 
Assessment (CIMIA) program to operationalize a scalable, semi-automated Decision 
Support System (DSS) tool.  The CIMIA DSS intends to provide decision makers with 
near real-time cyber awareness prior to, during, and post cyber incident situations through 
documentation of relationships, interdependencies, and criticalities among information 
assets, the communications infrastructure, and the operations mission impact.   
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 AN ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION ASSET VALUTION (IAV)  
QUANTIFICATION METHODOLOGY FOR APPLICATION WITH  
CYBER INFORMATION MISSION IMPACT ASSESSMENT (CIMIA) 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a 
hundred battles.  If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory 
gained you will also suffer a defeat.  If you know neither the enemy nor 
yourself, you will succumb in every battle,” as interpreted by David E. 
Hawkins and Shan Rajagopal (Hawkins and Rajagopal 2005:134). 
- Sun Tzu  
 
 
Background 
In a very real human way, we deal with valuation daily.  In the morning a person 
makes a decision on whether to have coffee or cola.  Internally, the person places a value 
on each of the drinks and then compares the values before making a decision.  The 
valuation process may include tangible items such as cost or caloric content.  The 
valuation process may also include intangible items such as a personal desire for one 
drink over the other.  In the end, a small valuation process takes place to value which 
drink to choose before heading off for work.  Value is currently playing a role in the 
information asset (InfoA) prioritization, however the details, characteristics, and 
arrangement of this role is uncertain due to the lack of research into this topic area.  As 
Sun Tzu wisely suggests, information asset valuation may become a vital component of 
the Air Force (AF) ability at proactively understanding yourself as a service, before, 
during, and after battle. 
1 
 Understanding value is not as easy as a math equation and requires broader 
acceptance of intrinsic-based qualities such as intangibility.  In the accounting discipline, 
intangible assets are “non-physical such as franchises, trademarks, patents, copyrights, 
goodwill, equities, mineral rights, securities and contracts (as distinguished from physical 
assets) that grant rights and privileges, and have value for the owner,”(IGBV 2007), and 
“assets (not including financial assets) that lack physical substance,” (FASB141 
2001:105).  Ultimately, intangible assets are difficult to accurately value due to the 
subjective nature of the assessor. 
Importance of Information and System of Systems 
There is little doubt about the utility of information and the system of systems 
connecting the military and society as a whole.  From a historical military standpoint, war 
is possibly the most powerful demonstration of the system, and information importance, 
as they are considered priceless between battling nations from the Roman courier scalp 
tattoo to the World War II French Resistance radio broadcast (Miller 2005:58).  
Information is separate from the systems that collect, manipulate, distribute, and 
aggregate that information, with information being a valuable asset; moreover, the very 
age we live in, the information age, underscores the value of information (Nichols, Ryan 
et al. 2000:544).   
Current Information Asset Valuation Methods 
The current activity of information asset valuation used in the military is founded 
in the valuation of tangible computer system infrastructure as a whole entity, and 
information components, such as routers, servers, radios and other such physical devices 
2 
 (Wong-Jiru 2006:26) that are used to manipulate, store, and transfer information.  The 
valuation for these tangible items is through procurement or replacement cost.  In terms 
of degradation, or failure, the valuation process includes costs for recovery, lost 
productivity, or lost revenue (Horony 1999:39).  This method is predominant because 
people may more easily understand and work within this method; moreover, people may 
easily access source documents to define these costs such as purchase orders or personnel 
pay checks.   
Importance of Information Asset Valuation (IAV) 
This research intends to illustrate the benefit of the information asset valuation 
(IAV) methodology by providing foundational research toward potential and viable 
solutions to the problems of a lack of effective bonding between infrastructure to mission, 
lack of effective bonding between the competing functions of communications and 
operations, and the lack of immediate and effective cyber battlespace awareness for 
decision makers.  Decision makers would benefit from having a single, recognizable, 
reference value for each information asset.  The single recognizable reference value for 
each information asset should enable decision makers to quickly and easily understand 
the importance of the information asset’s relationship to the mission. 
Current State of Communications and Operations 
In the Air Force, the two functionalized organizations of Communications and 
Operations are responsible for valuation of information assets in the cyber environment 
when incidents occur.  The basis for an information asset valuation, both current and 
future, is knowledge of the mission and knowledge of the information infrastructure 
3 
 supporting the mission.  Figure 1 illustrates the frequent problem with the functional 
separation of the Communications and the Operations communities:  statement from 
Communicator to Operator “Circuit 7JA is down”; Operator replies “What does that 
mean to me?” and, “What is the impact?”  The Communications area of concern is 
maintaining the devices to successfully pass bits and bytes.  This action does not include 
management of the content, such as information, passing through the devices, therefore 
Communications cannot adequately respond to Operations on the issue of mission 
impact.  In Figure 1, the resulting problem is illustrated, but from the opposite 
perspective: statement from Operator to Communicator “Our ATO terminal is down”; 
Communicator replies “All circuits and systems are in good working order.”  This 
example demonstrates a typical disconnect between the Communication community’s 
emphasis on cyber activity and the Operation community’s emphasis on mission 
capability.  The potential answer to this problem can be met with one of two approaches: 
1) developing personnel with experiences in both Communications and Operations to 
build a bridge of common understanding for mission impact, or 2) embedding the 
experience and knowledge into a Decision Support Software (DSS) tool that presents to 
personnel the common understanding for mission impact.  Each day Communications and 
Operations personnel filling these positions gain experience to bridge this problem gap.  
However, a well known issue in the Air Force is that personnel move from assignment to 
assignment undermining the aspect of mission continuity.  The gains achieved by 
personnel in knowledge and experience move with personnel, and this initiates a new 
training cycle for the new personnel.  Embedding knowledge and experience into the 
4 
 software of a DSS tool will enable new personnel to quickly increase on-the-job 
experience and knowledge for accuracy of the decision-making process.  
 
Figure 1. Communications and Operations Disconnect 
 
 
The IAV methodology is important in order to provide cyber situational 
awareness for military commanders in achieving timely and effective decision making.  
The ultimate goal of this research is to develop foundational methodologies for the 
creation of a semi-automated Cyber Incident Mission Impact Assessment (CIMIA) DSS 
tool.  CIMIA intends to provide a single integrated presentation of near real-time cyber 
environmental awareness to the competing functions of mission capability (operations) 
and the supporting computer infrastructure (communications) prior to, during, and post 
cyber incident.  In essence, CIMIA will facilitate a bridge of mission capability to the 
5 
 infrastructure for on-demand damage and mission impact assessment.  Readily available 
information asset identification, mission mapping, and valuation will enable decision 
makers to quickly and accurately understand the impact of a cyber incident without 
expending extraordinary time and effort to gather the information manually. 
Cyber Incident Mission Impact Assessment (CIMIA) Project 
CIMIA intends to connect the segmented information systems, which currently 
respond in a reactive manual method, with near real-time visual technologies.  Previous 
research was conducted by Fortson, who identified five sequential, and potentially 
simultaneous, components phases for creating a CIMIA tool, as illustrated in Figure 2: 1) 
Information Asset Identification (IAI) is the realization that an information asset exists 
and needs to be documented; 2) Information Asset-to-Mission Mapping (IAMM) is the 
process of documenting the internal and external connections of the information asset; 3) 
Information Asset Valuation (IAV) is the process of establishing a standardized and 
comparable information asset criticality value; 4) Damage Assessment (DA) is the 
presentation of cyber battlespace awareness with near real-time information asset status 
for decision makers to act upon, and 5) Damage-to-Mission Assessment/Impact 
Reporting (DMAIR) is the information asset historical archive for trend analysis and 
what-if scenario forecasting (Fortson 2007).  Shaw contributed significant foundational 
research toward the IAI and IAMM methodologies in relation to specific Air Operation 
Center (AOC) processes (Shaw 2007).  The IAV methodology has the potential to play a 
significant role in providing military organizations with cyber battlespace awareness 
through establishment of a standard for valuing information assets.  IAV, and value itself, 
6 
 is a human behavior-driven exercise that requires subjective qualitative measurement to 
quantify the human behavior.  Providing a defensible methodology is the solution that 
will allow users of the IAV methodology to have faith in the results; moreover, an IAV 
methodology may be the key component binding the other CIMIA functions to together. 
 
Figure 2. CIMIA Five Component Phases 
 
 
 
Value is important to providing decision makers with cyber environment 
awareness.  Just the level of assisting to describe the cyber environment in terms of value 
should organize the chaos of information overload to a useable and actionable 
information state.  At precisely the moment when an incident occurs is when personnel 
time is at its most critically precious.  It is at this moment when personnel need to 
concentrate on solutions for maintaining the network integrity, availability, 
confidentiality, or mission capability instead of reactively using this time to gather 
7 
 information on the system of systems infrastructure that could have been analyzed long 
before the incident occurred.  When the adversary is attempting simple surveillance, or 
full-scale attack of the infrastructure, is precisely when personnel resources are more 
useful at analyzing the situation with positive cyber awareness for accurate and effective 
decision making.  The following passage further highlights the desperate need for 
information and system of system awareness: 
The morning of 9/11 showed, the hijacking of airplanes, the time it took 
authorities to understand that a serious problem existed, and the absence 
of procedures for handling this situation generated a particularly strong 
sense of surprise.  During several minutes the U.S. Military and civilian 
air authorities found themselves in a state of uncertainty and, at best in an 
inadequate defensive posture.  Just a momentary loss of air superiority 
proved enough to cause terrible losses, (Larribau 2007:28). 
Little discussion is necessary to further highlight the importance of information and the 
system of systems in context of cyber environmental awareness as these now pervade 
everyday society; moreover, the awareness has been instilled that the cyber domain 
posses at least as many threats as the cyber domain provides solutions. 
Problem Statement and Investigative Questions 
This research endeavors to answer the research and investigative questions that 
are critical to the creation of a useable and trustworthy IAV methodology: 
R.  What is the process for attributing value to an information asset? 
1. What is an information asset (InfoA)? 
2. Can qualitative factors establish value? 
3. Can a single value be established for an information asset? 
4. Can one information asset have different values? 
5. Are academic discipline models adaptable to information asset valuation? 
8 
 Thesis Construction 
The research into the IAV methodology relies heavily on quantification of human 
behavior and development of a new research topic area.  These two situations compel the 
research to deviate from commonly accepted research methodologies.  The most 
appropriate methodology is an exploratory methodological strategy and approach hybrid 
by taking the most beneficial portions from other methodologies with a qualitative 
approach.  This research has been conducted in the multi-phase of a qualitative case study 
approach examining public sector, including accounting and law, and military sector 
discipline methodologies for adaptation to the IAV methodology.  
The accounting discipline is well known for valuing tangible business assets, such 
buildings, but this discipline also provides valuation for intangible assets, such as 
trademarks, Fair Market Value (FMV), brand and trademark, receivables for bad debt and 
subjective analysis will be examined from the accounting discipline. 
Intangible asset valuation is also a concern in the legal discipline in the two main 
areas of intellectual property infringement and natural resource damage.  The area of law 
lending itself to intangible asset valuation may be found in the documents covering 
litigation damage assessment such as the United States Codes (USC) and Comprehensive 
Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). 
Military processes concern themselves with the quantification of intangibles 
through the use of defensible qualitative methodologies.  Some of the processes 
examined in this research include the Classified National Security Information (CNSI), 
Operational Security (OPSEC), and Operational Risk Management (ORM). 
9 
 Foundational Terminology 
For the purposes of this research, it is important to establish a common 
understanding of the terms Information Asset Valuation methodology and information 
asset.  Information Asset Valuation, referred to as IAV, signifies the methodology or 
model under construction in this research.  Information asset, referred to InfoA, is the 
descriptor to identify the entity being attributed a value.  The term information asset is 
very ambiguous, and mostly undefined as a term, but is commonly found in the 
management disciplines.  This ambiguity for information and asset stems from the 
separate and independent use of the words which does not necessitate a precise definition 
for information asset as a complete term.  Prominent information and knowledge 
management leaders, including Thomas Davenport, Laurence Prusak, and Peter Drucker, 
defined data as objective facts that takes shape when context forms information; and, the 
addition of personal values, experiences, and insight forms knowledge (Drucker 1993; 
Davenport and Prusak 2000).  The recognition of information as an entity within the 
business mainstream, whether originating with an accountant or a master business 
administrator, has led to the close attachment of the term information to the term asset.  
However, information asset is not defined and the reader is left to assume the meaning of 
information asset.  Information, as Davenport, Prusak, and Drucker identified, is a 
compilation of data within a context and an asset is something having value to an entity.  
Information asset, as a term, creates many avenues of definition possibilities.  The 
following scenario is based on the following:  Corporation Alpha is a widget maker; 
Alpha has a selling staff that utilizes a sales contact listing (SCL) composed of 
10 
 prospective and existing clients that need widgets; and, the SCL is maintained on the 
SCL1000 database server.  The first view of information asset may be the information 
itself in the form of the SCL with which Alpha generates revenue.  A second view of an 
information asset may be the sales staff that initiate and maintain close relationships with 
the SCL clients that provide the revenue.  A third view is that the information asset may 
be the SCL1000 database server on the internal network for sales staff to access or the 
flow of the SCL back and forth from the SCL1000 through the network to the sales 
staff’s computer terminals. A fourth view may be that the SCL has intrinsic qualities 
because it provides a revenue generating capability that Alpha’s competitors do not own.  
This example demonstrates that an information asset may be the information itself, the 
flow of information, or intangible characteristics.  
An information asset is more than just information tangibles such as static 
information, physical servers, or digital documents.  Information does have value unto 
itself, as do the systems that process that information.  The system of systems creates a 
situation where a single functional quantity of information may span across a labyrinth of 
computers, circuits, routers, geo-locations and provide an intrinsic advantage to the 
individual or organization.  The failure of any one of these smaller components will result 
in the degradation or failure of that information process.  For the purposes of this research 
an information asset (InfoA) is the combination of tangible assets (servers, circuits, data) 
and intangible assets (synergy, information, knowledge) that span internal and external 
organizational boundaries to create an interdependent system without form, substance, or 
physical presence.  An InfoA is the convergence of information tangibles, information 
11 
 intangibles, and information flow to materialize as a functional entity that enhances the 
mission capability, as illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Conceptual InfoA 
 
 
 
Research Scope 
The scope of developing quantification of an InfoA to a useable value as a 
research topic can be a limitless endeavor.  However, the ability to model InfoA valuation 
may prove to be severely important in achieving the desperately needed capability of 
cyber battlespace awareness and therefore must be addressed, discussed, and researched.  
As a concept, the IAV methodology is applicable to modern society on the whole through 
the many network-connected and driven-businesses, the banking industry, and the U.S. 
12 
 Government; moreover, an examination of all these could lead to a situation of never 
ending analysis.  Refinement of a manageable research topic area and research question 
was provided with the focus of the CIMIA project on the DoD, specifically on the AF.  
Embedding knowledge and experience into DSS tools, such as CIMIA, will enable 
planners and commanders in tactical, operational, and strategic levels of command to 
interact with the cyber environment; resulting in the application of another level of 
refinement.  The valuation of InfoAs will provide the capability to interact with the cyber 
environment in the past through historical event analysis, in the present with near real-
time alerts, as well as in the future through what-if driven scenario development.  
Achieving this level of cyber awareness calls for a multi-step methodology including: 
developing factors, scaling factors, aggregating factor values, aggregating across InfoA 
values, and binding InfoA values to mission impact.  The true scope and focus of the IAV 
methodology is on, and for, the personnel who perform against the natural order of the 
existing system to establish the communications and operations InfoA valuations every 
day with archaic, manual, and cumbersome practices. 
Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, the need for an Information Asset Valuation (IAV) methodology 
was presented to motivate the research.  Value is currently playing a role in the 
information asset (InfoA) prioritization, however the details, characteristics, and 
arrangement of this role is uncertain.  The IAV methodology proposes the InfoA term 
definition as the convergence of information tangibles, information intangibles, and 
information flow to materialize as a functional entity that enhances the mission capability 
13 
 14 
through physical and intrinsic contribution.  Existing non-military and military valuation 
models are examined for adaptability to the IAV methodology.  The IAV methodology is 
an attempt to assist the AF by providing an understanding of friendly InfoAs actively 
being utilized in the cyber domain and the association InfoAs have to mission impact via 
an automated DSS tool, CIMIA.  Furthermore, this research will provide insight to future 
research efforts at understanding the criticality of adversarial information dependencies. 
 
 II. Literature Review 
Chapter Overview 
In this chapter, a literature review is conducted of various public and government 
sector discipline models for adaptation to valuing an InfoA: accounting models, legal 
models, and military models.  In this chapter is the foundation of research contributing to 
analysis discussed in later chapters, as illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4. Literature Research Graphic 
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 Accounting Discipline Models 
The accounting discipline is well known for tracking and valuing tangible 
business assets, such as equipment, and this discipline also provides tracking and valuing 
for intangible assets.  The very definition of InfoA includes both tangible and intangible 
characteristics to formula valuation.  Financial, or business valuation, is the umbrella 
term for the accounting area dealing with many intangible asset valuation approaches that 
may apply to InfoA valuation.  Two additional accounting areas that may apply to InfoA 
valuation are receivables for bad debt and subjective analysis.  The accounting discipline 
values intangibles through market value, equivalent item comparisons, categorization, 
statistical calculations, and subjectivity. 
Intangible Asset 
Intangible assets are “non-physical assets such as franchises, trademarks, patents, 
copyrights, goodwill, equities, mineral rights, securities and contracts (as distinguished 
from physical assets) that grant rights and privileges, and have value for the owner,” 
(IGBV 2007), and “assets (not including financial assets) that lack physical substance,” 
(FASB142 2001:105).  The accounting discipline’s governing body identifies twenty-
nine intangible assets classes (see Appendix A) ranging from patents representing ideas 
to ownership of the oxygen we breathe (Bossaerts 2001:28).   
Financial Accounting Approaches 
Financial accounting addresses the valuation of intangible assets like InfoAs and 
is divided into three approaches: 1) market or market comparable approach, where the 
costs of similar assets being sold are compared; 2) cost or asset approach, where the cost 
16 
 is determined by what a willing buyer would pay for the asset; and 3) income approach, 
where the value is determined by how much revenue may be created from intangibles 
such as patents (King 2002:75; Hitchner 2003:7).  Although each approach may be 
available for valuation, the income approach most directly deals with intangible asset 
valuation.  The income approach is further divided into the sub-approaches of valuation: 
Fair Market Value (FMV), Brand/Trade Names/Trademarks Value, Goodwill/Residual 
Value (King 2002; Hitchner 2003; Roche 2005), Investment/Intrinsic Value (Hitchner 
2003; Roche 2005), Software Value (Hitchner 2003; King 2006), Research and 
Development Value (R&DV) (Roche 2005; King 2006). 
Fair Market Value (FMV) 
Fair Market Value (FMV) is “the price at which the property would change hands 
between a willing buyer having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts,” (TR 2007).  
FMV is also commonly known as the Fair Value (FV).  FV is “the amount at which an 
asset could be bought or sold in a current transaction between willing parties, that is other 
than in a forced or liquidation sale,” (Bossaerts 2001:106).  The FMV valuation process 
requires a market with a willing buyer and seller who conduct an economic transaction to 
establish value; moreover, comparing similar items is the foundation of this valuation 
approach.  A very good example of an intangible asset that utilizes the FMV approach is 
found in the area of intellectual property valuation.  Intangible assets, such as intellectual 
property “are most generally valued through the fair market value (FMV) approach which 
is the result of what others in the market place have judged the value to be”, and “where 
the public market does not exist, the application of FMV becomes progressively more 
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 judgmental and less reliable,” (Roche 2005:128).  FMV utilizes a comparative analysis to 
determine intangible asset value. 
Goodwill/Residual  
Goodwill is the amount of residual value left when every other business 
component has been removed from the whole value and may “sometimes be used to 
describe the aggregate of all intangible assets of a business,” (Hitchner 2003:813).  
Residual value takes the value of the whole company, subtracts all tangible and intangible 
assets from the business sell price, then the leftover value is attributed the intangible asset 
of goodwill (Roche 2005:125; King 2006:10).  For example, if a company has a purchase 
price of $1,000 with tangible assets worth $800 and intangible assets worth $100, then 
goodwill is $100 ($1000 – $800 - $100 = $100).  In the aggregate group approach, $200 
($100 + $100) worth of intangible assets and goodwill are divided among the total 
number of intangible assets.   
Investment/Intrinsic  
Investment value is “the value to a particular investor, which reflects the 
particular and specific attributes of that investor,” (Hitchner 2003:5).  Intrinsic value, “the 
value that an investor considers, on the basis of an evaluation or available facts, to be the 
true or real value that will become the market value when other investors reach the same 
conclusion,” (IGBV 2007), and investment value, are similar approaches.  The key for 
both of these approaches is the development of a personally internal, subjective factor for 
establishing value.  For example, one person may determine that color is the most 
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 important factor when purchasing a vehicle where another person may determine that the 
sound of a vehicle’s engine is the most important factor. 
Research and Development (R&D) 
Research and Development (R&D) utilizes the two valuation approaches for in-
process R&D and new technologies: 1) Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) or the 
alternate CAPM, and 2) estimation.  The CAPM utilizes a beta measurement taken over 
at least 60 increments such as daily, weekly, or monthly, to provided a statistical average 
value, and the alternative CAPM requires “at least three separate CAPM calculations 
(low, medium, and high) with an assigned probability of occurrence,” (Roche 2005:63).  
Even with statistical support, estimation of an intangible asset is an “educated guess that 
is often the only solution, recognizing that the margin for error may be significant,” 
(Roche 2005:129).   
Software 
Coding rate is the driver behind software valuation and follows a three step 
approach: 1) determine the number of lines of code a programmer creates within a time 
window like a single hour to establish the code rate, 2) divide the total number of code 
lines within the software by the coding rate, and 3) multiply the number of hours by the 
lines of code required (Hitchner 2003:789).  For example, in a situation with 10,000 lines 
of code, a programmer with a coding rate of 2 lines per hour, and a programmer with a 
pay rate of $30 an hour would have a software value of $150,000 ( 10,000/2 = 5,000 
hours; 5,000 hours * $30 = $150,000).  
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 Trademark, Brand Name/Trade Name 
Brand or trade names and trademarks generally utilize two approaches for 
valuation: 1) direct cash flow analysis, and 2) relief from royalty.  Direct cash flow 
utilizes Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) where a 5-year projection is 
multiplied by a weighted debt-to-equity ratio (King 2006:129).  Relief from royalty is 
determined by answering the question, “how much would the owner of the trade name 
pay to keep the use of the name or if the owner lost the right to utilize the name for a 5-
year period,” (Hitchner 2003:80).  For example, a large company like Disney would 
determine how much it would pay to retain the use of the Disney brand name if Disney 
were to lose the Disney brand name.  This valuation is an “estimate of what the brand 
name itself does from the perspective of the customer,” and “it should be recognized that 
the estimate of the price…is still just that—an estimate,” (King 2002:15).  
Receivables for Bad Debt Approach 
Receivables for bad debt is a statistical approach to determining intangible asset 
value because “we know a certain percentage of our customers will not pay, but we do 
not know in advance which they will be,” (King 2006:278).  The receivable for bad debt 
approach establishes value through creation of a statistical percentage representing the 
number of accounts that will potentially default during the year.  A second sub-approach 
“is to look at what a factoring company would pay because factoring companies actually 
buy receivables for cash” and this transaction for the purchase of receivable for bad debt 
establishes a value (King 2006:280). 
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 Subjective Analysis Approach  
In many instances, valuation for intangible assets is a subjective assumption 
supported by a defensible methodology.  Some valuation experts see the assumption 
approaches as “the appraiser makes the assumption, or the client makes the assumption,” 
(King 2002:143), and some negotiation occurs to establish the value.  Alfred M. King, 
appraiser, and financial valuation expert states: “Determining values for intangible assets 
requires judgment and a lot of assumptions go into any valuation.  These assumptions 
deal with the future and it is common for appraiser to state that valuation is an art, not a 
science,” (King 2002:143).  To further the point of subjective valuation “the Federal 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has specified that appraisers should determine the 
amount that market participants would pay for the intangible asset.  In effect it is up to 
the appraiser to estimate what the intangible asset(s) would be worth to other than the 
actual buyer,” (King 2002:xv, 18; King 2006:176).  Taken in combination, professional 
judgments based on personnel having gained experience and knowledge of the subject is 
at the forefront of appropriateness in the valuation process.  Intangible assets have a 
similarity with tangible assets “like tangible property, intellectual property can be bought, 
sold, and rented.  Also like tangible property, it can be lost or destroyed through 
carelessness or neglect” and “this value is often overlooked, underestimated, and 
underreported,” (Poltorak and Lerner 2002:xiii).  When dissecting the value or valuation, 
“value is the degree of usefulness or desirability of something, especially in comparison 
with other things where valuation is an assessment or measurement of something with 
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 respect to its embodiment of a certain value,” (Andreissen 2004:18).  Intellectual property 
is generally recognized as trademarks/service marks, patents, and copyrights. 
Accounting Discipline Models Summary 
Valuation of information is an intangible asset that FASB 141 defines and FASB 
142 defines the specific monetary and non-monetary assessment method.  Valuation of 
intangibles, such as InfoAs, within the accounting discipline has been developed and 
proven over time to be trusted assessment methodologies such as monetary market 
values, equivalent item comparisons, categorization, statistical calculations, and 
subjectivity.  Specifically, the accounting discipline utilizes both tangible and intangible 
methods for valuing assets such as FMV, goodwill, investment, intrinsic, research and 
development, software, trademark, receivables for bad debt, and subjective analysis.  
Legal Discipline Models 
This literature review will examine the intangible asset valuation process through 
the legal discipline in the two main areas such as intellectual property infringement, and 
natural resource damages.  Attorneys may be present during the initial valuation of 
intangible assets, such as registering patents, but attorneys are most prevalent during 
situations where intangible assets have come to some injury such as infringement or 
damages assessment.  An examination of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), United 
States Codes (USC), and Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and 
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) will provide a better understanding of how the legal 
objective and subjective methods for valuation may be adapted to the IAV model. 
 
22 
 Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 
The UCC is the foundational guidance standardizing commerce issues across state 
boundaries.  The definition for intangible asset is viewed by the UCC as “General 
Intangible” and found in Article 9, Secured Transactions, subpart 9-102(a)(42) Index of 
definitions, as “any personal property, including things in action, other than accounts, 
chattel paper, commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, documents, goods, instruments, 
investment property, letter-of-credit rights, letters of credit, money, and oil, gas, or other 
minerals before extraction,” (UCC 2004). 
The UCC definition for intangible asset is more effective at describing what an 
intangible is not than what an intangible is, such as intellectual property.  Intellectual 
Property (IP) is simply a broad category for intangible items lacking the standard 
physical, distinguishable substance where valuation is through a residual or second-hand 
method.  IP includes patents, copyrights, and trademarks, also known as servicemarks, 
are documented in many laws and statues such as the Copyright Act of 1976, the Digital 
Millennium Act of 1998, and the Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005 and 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), (CA1976 1976; DMCA 1998; 
FECA 2005; USPTO 2005). 
U. S. C. Title 18, Sections 1831-9 Trade Secret Protection 
Trade secrets are a form of intellectual property patents, copyrights, and 
trademarks.  Although trade secrets have long been in use the government provide 
significant statutory protection until the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, and inclusion 
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 to USC 18 Crime and Criminal Procedures (USC18§1831-9 1996).  A trade secret is 
defined by USC 18 as: 
the term "trade secret" means all forms and types of financial, business, 
scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information, including 
patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, 
prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or 
codes, whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, 
compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, 
photographically, or in writing if (A) the owner thereof has taken 
reasonable measures to keep such information secret; and (B) the 
information derives independent economic value, (USC18§1831-9 1996). 
 
Trade secrets infringement entering the legal system and when offenders are 
found guilty, are assessed and sentenced based on the judgment of the court with 
penalties ranging from forfeiture of illegal gains to criminal penalties with fines and 
confinement (USC18§1831-9 1996). 
Patents 
Patents are the method for protecting the ideas of individuals found in commonly 
utilized products and services.  The USPTO definition of a patent is “the granting of a 
property rights to the inventor,” and the USPTO further describes the patent right as 
“excluding others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling, or importing the 
invention into the United States,” (USPTO 2005).  The USPTO identifies three types of 
patents: 1) Utility patent, approved for people who “ invent or discover any new and 
useful process, machine, article of manufacture, or composition of matter” or create an 
improvement for another invention; 2) Design patent, approved for people who “invent a 
new, original, and ornamental design for an article of manufacture”; and 3) Plant patent, 
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 approved for people who “invent or discover and asexually reproduction of any distinct 
and new variety of plant”(USPTO 2005). 
Copyrights 
Copyrights are the method for protecting the ideas of people seen and heard in 
writings and recordings.  A copyright is the protection of an author’s “original works of 
authorship including literary, dramatic, musical, artistic, and certain other intellectual 
works, both published and unpublished,” (USPTO 2005).  The copyright owner has the 
exclusive right “to reproduce the copyrighted work, to prepare derivative work, to 
distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work, to perform the copyrighted 
work publicly, or to display the copyrighted work publicly,” (USPTO 2005). 
Trademarks/Servicemarks 
Trademarks are those monikers associated with given products or services.  
Trademark, or servicemark, is a “word, name, symbol, or device that is used in trade with 
goods to indicate the source of the goods and to distinguish them from the goods of 
others with a servicemark identifying a service rather than a product;” furthermore, the 
owner receives exclusive right “to prevent others from using a confusingly similar mark, 
but not to prevent others from making the same goods or from selling the same goods or 
services under a clearly different mark,” (USPTO 2005). 
Infringement 
The legal environment does not usually engage with the initial valuation of an 
intangible asset but does engage with valuation in the form of infringement, damage and 
award.  The foundation of an attorney’s involvement with intangible asset valuation relies 
25 
 on some occurrence of wrong or injury with the intangible asset, such as infringement.  
The infringement is just the beginning as negotiation between parties may occur, but, 
over time, litigation may allow for assessment of damage and award.  The USPTO 
utilizes patent infringement found in the United States Codes (USC) as a broad 
infringement definition for all intellectual property and intangible assets (USPTO 2005).   
U. S. C. Title 35, Section 271 Patent Infringement 
Infringement occurs when someone other than the intangible asset owner attempts 
to gain from the intangible asset or someone other than the owner prevents a gain by the 
owner from the intangible asset.  The intangible asset owner is frequently referred to as 
the claimant because the owner lodges a lawsuit against the infringer.  An infringer is the 
person, corporation, or entity who infringes upon the intangible asset owner.  The USC 
utilizes the patent infringement statute to define all cases of infringement against the 
broad category of intangible assets as “whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to 
sell, or sells any patented [copyrighted, trademarked, or intellectual property] invention, 
within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during 
the term of the patent therefore, infringes the patent,” (USC35§271 2000).  A 
contributory infringer may be liable for knowingly offering to sell the “component of a 
patented machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a material or apparatus 
for use in practicing a patented process” which constitutes a material part of the 
invention; moreover, the contributory infringing applies when the infringer knowing 
adapts the invention as “suitable for substantial non-infringing use” or circumvents 
infringement (Cooper, Watson et al. 2000:1). 
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 Recovery by the claimant from the infringer is accomplished by one or both of the 
possible methods: injunction relief and damage.  Injunction relief from infringement is 
“granted against an infringer to prevent the commercial manufacture, use, offer to sell, or 
sale within the United States or importation into the United States”.  The second form of 
relief, “damages or other monetary relief may be awarded against an infringer only if 
there has been commercial manufacture, use, offer to sell, or sale,” (Cooper, Watson et al. 
2000:2).  Specific methods for making a determination on damages is covered separate 
section of USC, under Title 35 Section 284, but “the court will award to a successful 
patent infringement plaintiff damages sufficient to place the plaintiff in the position that 
the plaintiff would have occupied had the infringement not occurred,” (Poltorak and 
Lerner 2002:125) 
U. S. C. Title 35, Section 284 Patent Damages 
Patent damage provides a method for valuing an intangible asset through 
assessment of a monetary device.  In many cases the damage for infringement is pre-
defined prior to any occurrence of infringement.  There are three key characteristics of 
this methodology for valuation of intangible assets: 1) a pre-determination of the 
valuation standard, 2) a requirement to actively think ahead in developing the standard, 
and 3) a documentation of the standard enables all potential parties to review and 
interpret the valuation process prior to an actionable occurrence.  One method for 
assessing damage is through “the court awarding damage adequate to compensate for the 
infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the 
invention by the infringer,” (Berry 2004:35).  Reasonably royalty is calculated utilizing 
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 the previous year’s “not to exceed 6 years for profits that would have been earned by the 
[claimant] if the infringer had not infringed, or is established by the prevailing royalty 
standard for the industry,” (Rockman 2004:315).  Assessing damage may be the 
responsibility of the jury or the court and “in either event the court may increase the 
damage up to three times the amount found or assessed,” (USC35§284 2000).  This 
method enables a creation of value for intangible assets from nothing.  For example, 
should a corporation begin selling the same recipe of soda as a existing brand, the jury or 
the court may access the damage of $1 million; resulting in establishment of a base value 
for the intangible at $1 million.  Furthering the example, the judge, or court, has the 
authority to subjectively determine an amount for triple the original assessment value, or 
$3 million. 
U. S. C. Title 17, Section 504 Copyrights 
More than under patent infringement, the copyright infringement damage is very 
specific.  A copyright infringer is “liable for either: 1) the copyright owner's actual 
damage and any additional profits of the infringer, or 2) statutory damage, as actual 
damages and profits,” (USC17 2000).  Damages for copyright include “only of the 
infringer's gross revenue, and the infringer is required to prove his or her deductible 
expenses and the elements of profit attributable to factors other than the copyrighted 
work,” (USC17 2000).  The claimant my elect statutory damage at any time prior to final 
judgment, applying to every individual instance of infringement, or “a sum of not less 
than $750, or more than $30,000, as the court considers just,” (USC17 2000).  In the case 
of copyright infringement the court has the authority to consider what is just and for a 
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 willfully committed infringement the court may increase the award to “a sum of not more 
than $150,000,” (USC17 2000).  Damage is a method of compensation to the claimant 
and hopefully prevents the infringer from “unfairly benefiting from a wrongful act,” 
(USC17 2000).  Similar to patent infringement, the copyright valuation method 
establishes a value from nothing by providing a valuation standard prior to an occurrence 
of infringement.  
U. S. C. Title 15, Section 1117 Trademarks/Servicemarks 
Comparable to copyright infringement, the damage process for trademark and 
servicemark is specific.  Claimants may recover the profits the infringer gained from the 
wrongful act and any damage sustained by the claimant as a result of the infringement 
offense.  Assessment of damage is accomplished by the court “may enter judgment, 
according to the circumstances of the case, for any sum above the amount found as actual 
damage, not exceeding three times such amount,” (USC15 2000).  The subjective nature 
of the court’s assessment is highlighted by the statement, “if the court shall find that the 
amount of the recovery based on profits is either inadequate or excessive the court may in 
its discretion enter judgment for such sum as the court shall find to be just, according to 
the circumstances of the case,” (USC15 2000).  The specific statutory damages are an 
amount of “not less than $500 or more than $100,000” per separate instance of 
infringement, or in cases of willful and wrongful infringement, “not more than 
$1,000,000” per instance of infringement (USC15 2000).  The claimant has some leeway 
to determine at any time, prior to final judgment, a replacement of actual damage with an 
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 assessment of “not less than $1,000 and not more than $100,000” per instances of 
infringement as the “the court considers just,” (USC15 2000).  
Damages for Natural Assets 
A natural asset, or the environment, is another area of law where damage of an 
intangible asset may provide a valuation model and the statutory foundation for natural 
asset damage is the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability 
Act of 1980 (CERCLA).  CERCLA provides intangible asset valuation through 
assessment model as “appropriate remedial strategy that is selected after consideration of 
a range of alternatives for restoration, rehabilitation, replacement, and/or acquisition of 
equivalent resources,” (Lee and Bridgen 2002:219).  Natural assets are frequently termed 
as invaluable but “those practicing this legal discipline argue that even the priceless must 
be valued in a market-based society; for without valuation there will not be appropriate 
protection and conservation of resource for future generations,” (Lee and Bridgen 
2002:281).  CERCLA recognizes several methods for natural asset valuation: direct 
method, scaling, economic loss. 
Economic loss is the “loss of business revenue occasioned by a products’ failure 
to perform as expected or the inability to conduct business profitably for a period of 
time,” (Madden 1992:48).  For example, a polluted lake would impact the camping 
revenue for the period that campers cannot camp near the lake.  The direct method, very 
similar to economic loss, is defined as “the sum of losses in use and nonuse values 
resulting from injury to the quantity of quality of service floes of the natural resource,” 
(Kopp and Smith 1993:204).  To continue the camping example, the direct method 
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 accounts for not only the economic loss in camping revenue but also the potential for 
camping that would have been abundant during the same period.  The direct method 
accounts, over the same time period, for both the projection of resource use, such as the 
current season’s worth of camping, and the projection potential of resource use, such as 
the current season’s maximum camping occupancy.  Scaling, or indirect method, 
encompasses several methods to determine value: comparison, adjusting costs from a 
similar project to meet the existing asset; probability, using expected value estimates to 
determine the average; factor, summing the product of several income items or activities; 
and, standard time data, estimating the standard time required for restoration of the 
natural resource, (Lee and Bridgen 2002:294).  
Legal Discipline Models Summary 
The legal discipline, driven by the man years of developing legal judgments, has 
shown an in-depth methodology for valuing intangible assets in both a tangible, quantity 
aspects, and intangible, qualitative aspects.  Developing legal approaches over time 
through statute provide a subjective but trusted valuation methodology for information 
assets.  An examination of intangible valuation process through legal instruments such as 
UCC infringement statutes, USC patent, copyright, trademark/servicemark and trade 
secret statues, and CERCLA damage assessment method will provide a overall better 
understanding of how the legal objective and subjective methods for valuation may be 
adapted to the IAV model.  
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 Military Models 
The military processes are being reviewed for qualitative measures with 
defensible subjective methodologies in the areas of Base Civil Engineering Work Order 
Management (BCE-WOM), Communications Helpdesk Trouble Ticket Management 
(HTTM), Enlisted Evaluation System (EES), Classified National Security Information 
(CNSI), Operational Security (OPSEC), Operational Risk Management (ORM), and 
Universal Joint Task List (UJTL). 
Base Civil Engineering Work Order Management (BCE-WOM) 
Base Civil Engineering work order management (BCE-WOM) has the 
responsibility to “manage, control, plan, schedule, and program work requirements by the 
most efficient means” in terms of work orders as defined by the “scope and complexity of 
the requirement,” (AFI32-1001 2005:4-6).  From this guidance two categories have been 
defined: 1) Planned Work, “to includes minor construction where the planner determines 
the scope, method, and type of resources”; and 2) Direct Scheduled Work, “to include 
work that generally does not require detailed planning,” (AFI32-1001 2005:4-6). 
Planned work orders are provided with four priority categories: “Priority 1–
Mission, work in direct support of the overall base mission that, if not done, would 
reduce operational effectiveness; Priority 2–Safeguard Life and Property, work needed to 
give adequate security to areas subject to compromise, or to protect valuable property or 
equipment; Priority 3–Support, work that supports the mission or prevents a breakdown 
of essential operating or housekeeping functions; and  Priority 4–Necessary, not 
qualifying for higher priority,” (AFI32-1001 2005:4-6). 
32 
 Direct schedule work orders are also provided with four priority categories: 
“Emergency, work required to eliminate an emergency condition within 24 hours of 
notification that is detrimental to the mission or reduces operational effectiveness; 
Urgent, work that is not an emergency, but must be responded to; and Routine, work that 
does not qualify as emergency or urgent work,” (AFI32-1001 2005:4-6). 
Communications Helpdesk Trouble Ticket Management (HTTM) 
The Communications Helpdesk trouble ticket management (HTTM) process is the 
focal point for customers needing action on, and response to, communication’s process 
issues.  The Helpdesk is assigned the task of providing “network assistance, trouble 
resolution and will be based on a fully integrated trouble ticketing system. The trouble 
ticketing system should be able to automatically assign priorities and set response times 
and escalation timelines based on the criticality of the system being reported on,” (Lee 
and Bridgen 2002:48; AFI33-115V1 2006:20-35).  In no less than three hierarchical 
levels of Communications Management, Air Force Network Operations and Security 
Center (AFNOSC), Network Operations and Security Center (NOSC), and Network 
Control Center (NCC), are assigned responsibly to “analyze customer impact of all 
network incidents, problems and alerts, and develop corrective actions,” (AFI33-115V1 
2006:20-35).  At the same time the customer is directed that “during a trouble call, the 
end users will: (3) Provide service provider with a description of problem, its priority, 
and potential mission impact,” (AFI33-115V1 2006:74).  Trouble ticket priorities are 
assigned according to work centers for jobs under their control utilizing mission impacts 
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 to determine the priority,” (AFI33-115V1 2006:41).  The methodology being employed 
for helpdesk trouble ticket processes relies on local development of qualitative measures. 
Enlisted Evaluation System (EES) 
The Enlisted Evaluation System (EES) process tracks personnel behavior against 
qualitative measures with the two steps of performance feedback and performance 
reporting.  The purpose of the EES is three-fold:  1) establish individual expectations, 
achievement of expectation, and improvement at achieving expectations; 2) establish a 
long-term history of performance; and 3) provide comparable records for promotion 
boards (AFI21-116 2005:6).  Performance is the key evaluation standard reflecting how 
well “the individual does his or her job, and the qualities the individual brings to the job” 
and is “most important for successful mission accomplishment,” (AFI36-2406 2005:6).  
EES represents the epitome of human behavior quantification because EES looks to 
categories the spectrum of standards from worst performance to best performance 
through supervisory judgment. 
The first step in EES is accomplishment of the performance feedback worksheet 
(PFW) which is utilized to establish communication and roles between the rater and ratee.  
The two versions of the PFW, one for lower and one for higher enlisted ranks, share the 
assessment areas of: 1) Primary Duties, with the supervisor considering adapting, 
learning, quality, quantity, timeless, technical knowledge, leading, professional growth, 
communication skills, and managing and supervising; 2) Standards Enforcement and 
Personal Adherence, Conduct, Character, Military Bearing, Customs and Courtesies with 
the supervisor considering enforcement and personal adherence, dress and appearance, 
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 and personal and professional conduct on and off duty; 3) Resource Management and 
Decision Making, with the supervisor considering efficiency, judgment, setting and 
meeting goals; 4) Training, Education, Off-duty Education, Professional Military 
Education (PME), Professional Enhancement and Communication, with the supervisor 
considering ancillary, on-the-job, readiness, providing, supporting and personal growth; 
and 5) Leadership, Team Building, Follwership, and Mentorship, with the supervisor 
considering team accomplishments, leveraging personal experience and community 
support, and recognition and reward for others (AFForm931 2007; AFForm932 2007). 
These five subjective PFW categories on performance rating are then measured with the 
threshold standards of: “does not meet,” “meets,” “above average,” and, “clearly 
exceeds,” (AFForm931 2007; AFForm932 2007).   
The second step of the EES is documentation of performance with the Enlisted 
Performance Report (EPR).  The PFW and the EPR are nearly identical to provide a 
strong bond between the two tools; however the EPR differs significantly with a category 
for overall performance assessment.  The overall subjective assessment threshold 
standard categories are: “poor,” “needs improvement,” “average,” “above average,” and, 
“truly among the best,” (AFForm910 2007; AFForm911 2007). 
Classified National Security Information (CNSI) 
The Classified National Security Information (CNSI), or Executive Order (EO) 
13292, process establishes a standardized system for “classifying, safeguarding, and 
declassifying national security information,” (EO13292 2003:15315-9).  The EO defines 
who may classify information, and the qualitative measures for information classifying. 
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 Who may classify information rests in the two parts of: classification guide and 
classification authority.  The classification guide establishes the rules for dealing with 
specific information of an agency to “facilitate the proper and uniform derivative 
classification of information,” (EO13292 2003:15315-9).  The classification guide 
development is a requirement of the classification authority or the “senior agency 
official,” (EO13292 2003:15315-9). 
Three qualitative measurements with definitions are utilized to categorize 
information.  The three levels are: 1) Top Secret “shall be applied to information, the 
unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally 
grave damage to the national security,” 2) Secret “shall be applied to information, the 
unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage 
to the national security,” and 3) Confidential “shall be applied to information, the 
unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the 
national security,” (EO13292 2003:15315-9).   
Operational Security (OPSEC) 
The purpose of Operational Security (OPSEC) process, from an AF perspective, 
is to “reduce the vulnerability of AF missions from successful adversary collection and 
exploitation of critical information”, and an important function of the OPSEC process is 
the “identification of critical information for each operation, activity, and exercise 
planned, conducted or supported,” (AFI10-701 2007:4).  The OPSEC requirement for the 
Critical Information Listing (CIL), also known as Commander’s Critical Information 
Requirement (CCIR) or Critical Information Program (CIP), positions the commander to 
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 judge and ensure “CILs are developed and procedures are in place to control critical 
information and their indicators,” (AFI10-701 2007:9).  The CIL defines categories of 
“critical information as specific facts about friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities 
vitally needed by adversaries for them to plan and act effectively, so as to guarantee 
failure or unacceptable consequences for friendly mission accomplishment; best 
identified by the individuals responsible for the planning and execution of the unit’s 
mission” such as an “OWG [Operations Working Group] or staff planning team,” 
(AFI10-701 2007:12).  After the CIL has been developed, and vetted, the “commander 
must approve the list and then ensure their critical information is protected and/or 
controlled,” (AFI10-701 2007:12).  
Operational Risk Management (ORM) 
The Air Force Operational Risk Management (ORM) process is a “decision-
making process to systematically evaluate possible courses of action, identify risks and 
benefits, and determine the best course of action for any given situation,” (AFI90-901 
2001:1-3).  ORM allows commanders and individuals to limit risk through assessment of 
an activity’s steps such as flying, a joint exercise, loading a truck, or driving home at the 
end of the day, “with quantitative or qualitative measures to determine the potential of ill 
effects in such activities,” (AFI90-901 2001:1-3).  ORM utilizes a six step process 
highlighting qualitative measures of risk assessment.  
ORM functions through the utilization of six fundamental steps, as illustrated in 
Figure 5, Operational Risk Management Process, (AFPAM90-902 2000:7).  ORM Step 2, 
Assess the Risks, utilizes qualitative measures to associate hazards with risks through an 
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 “estimation of probability, severity, and exposure” for standardizing the comparison of 
differing risks (AFPAM90-902 2000:17).  The development of risks utilizes the three 
components of: 1) Probability as the estimate of the likelihood that a hazard will cause a 
loss, 2) Severity as the estimate of the extent of loss that is likely, and 3) Exposure as the 
number of personnel or resources affected by a given event or over time (AFPAM90-902 
2000:17).  The qualitative measure of severity categories “provide guidance to a wide 
variety of missions and systems: 1) Catastrophic, complete mission failure, death, or loss 
of system; 2) Critical, major mission degradation, severe injury, occupational illness or 
major system damage; 3) Moderate, minor mission degradation, injury, minor 
occupational illness, or minor system damage; and, 4) Negligible, less than minor 
mission degradation, injury, occupational illness, or minor system damage,” (AFPAM90-
902 2000:17).   
  
Figure 5. Operational Risk Management Process (AFPAM90-902 2000:7) 
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 Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) 
The Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) process is the overall guiding joint 
document with military service specific guidance through documents such as the Air 
Force Master Capabilities List (AFMCL), Army Universal Task List (AUTL), and 
Universal Naval Task List (UNTL).  UJTL consists of “tasks, conditions, and measures” 
enabling tasks to be “mapped to capabilities to meet operational mission requirements,” 
(CJCSM3500.04D 2005:A1).  Categories of measurement of performance rely upon the 
“commander’s approved measures and criteria [to] establish task standards based on 
mission requirements,” (CJCSM3500.04D 2005:A3).  Infrastructure Maintenance 
provides three representative qualitative measures:  Low, excess infrastructure capacity 
or low economic needs required to sustain economy; Moderate, economy capable of 
withstanding some loss of infrastructure; and High, full infrastructure required to sustain 
basic economy,” (CJCSM3500.04D 2005:C80). 
Military Models Summary 
Valuation of intangible such as information asset is possible with the time tested 
and developed processes utilized in the military.  This section has presented a review of 
military processes for qualitative measures with defensible subjective methodologies in 
the areas of BCE-WOM, Communications HTTM, EES, CNSI, OPSEC, ORM, and 
UJTL.  InfoA valuation requires the utilization of subjective qualitative measures similar 
to what may be found in existing military sector processes.  Qualitative measure for 
human behavior is subjective and a defensible methodology model is necessary to 
establish user faith in the InfoA valuation process. 
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Chapter Summary 
Existing models of subjective qualitative models for valuation of InfoAs from the 
public and military sectors have been examined for adaptability to the IAV methodology.  
The accounting, legal, and military models from this chapter are the foundation of 
research contributing to analysis discussed in later chapters.  Valuation of intangibles, 
such as InfoAs, is accomplished in the accounting discipline with proven and trusted 
methodologies of monetary market values, equivalent item comparisons, categorization, 
statistically calculations, and subjectivity such as FMV, goodwill, investment, intrinsic, 
research and development, software, trademark, receivables for bad debt, and subjective 
analysis.  An examination of intangible valuation process with legal instruments is 
accomplished with proven and trusted methodologies such as UCC, USC, and CERCLA 
statutes.  InfoA valuation, with or without the IAV methodology, requires the utilization 
of subjective qualitative measures similar to what may be found in existing military 
sector models such as BCE-WOM, Communications HTTM, EES, CNSI, OPSEC, ORM, 
and UJTL..  Qualitative measure for human behavior is subjective and a defensible 
methodology model is necessary to establish user faith in the InfoA valuation process. 
 
 III. Methodology 
Chapter Overview  
Conducting research can have many paths, each of which will be, and should be, 
critically analyzed for accuracy, legitimacy, and validity.  Finding the balance within a 
methodology for what may be the most well planned design versus the inherent failings 
within a methodology is an appropriate tactic to ensure new information comes to light as 
well as preserve the integrity of the information.  This initial research is a social science 
driven study for application of human behavior in the valuation of InfoAs and requires an 
exploratory qualitative methodology.  This chapter will discuss the methodological 
strategy, approach, and application of this research. 
Methodology Strategy 
Choosing the most effective methodological strategy for the specific research is 
important to achieve acceptance, credibility, and reliability.  Many methodologies exist to 
conduct research such as archival analysis, case study, or phenomenological study 
(Patton 1990:109; Yin 2003:5; Leedy and Ormrod 2005:68), but it is the most appropriate 
methodology that will yield the best contribution to the body of literature.  The research 
question being asked can identify which of the methodological strategies will be the most 
effective and fruitful. 
Yin, noted research design and methods author, identified the research 
possibilities as experiment, survey, archival analysis, history, or case study; moreover, 
determining the most appropriate research method may be accomplished through analysis 
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 of three conditions, as illustrated in Table 1: 1) the type of research question posed, 2) the 
extent of control an investigator has over actual behavior events, and 3) the degree of 
focus on contemporary as posed to historical events (Yin 2003:5).   
Table 1. Relevant Situations for Different Research Strategies (Yin 2003:5) 
Strategy 
Form of Research 
Question 
Requires Control of 
Behavioral Events? 
Focuses on 
Contemporary Events? 
 
Experiment 
 
How, why? 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Survey Who, what, where, how 
many, how much? 
No Yes 
Archival analysis Who, what, where, how 
many, how much? 
No Yes/No 
History How, why? No No 
Case Study How, why? No Yes 
 
The form of the research question such as who, what, what, how, and why may be 
used to distinguish among the research methods (Yin 2003:5).  Valuation of is a 
relatively new research area with little or no current body of research, process, 
framework, or methodology; therefore, research into this area is initial research.  This 
initial research looks to answer questions of “how does this work,” and “why does this 
work,” and for both the experiment and the survey an existing level of research is needed 
in order to prepare valid instruments for analysis.  Archival analysis questions such as 
“how many,” or “how much,” deal with the quantitative measurements which are not as 
42 
 compatible with social sciences.  History and case study most closely match the nature of 
the IAV methodology by asking the “how,” and “why,” questions. 
The level of behavior control that may be exercised in the research highlights two 
key initial investigative research elements.  These elements are flexibility for looking at 
all forms of source information and the planning of an unfettered research approach.  The 
case study provides for the broad range of investigative sources and has the “unique 
strength…to deal with a full variety of evidence—documents, artifacts, interviews, and 
observations—beyond what may be available for a historic study,” (Yin 2003:8).  
Historic and case study, as illustrated in Table 1, match the little or no exertion of control 
by researcher an individual’s internal process of valuation. 
The effect of contemporary events on investigative research into valuation of an 
InfoA is a vital issue in developing a research design.  An InfoA by definition is a new 
idea only existing in the contemporary environment; thus precluding historic analysis as a 
research method.  Additionally, the case study has the advantage over historic research in 
the ability of “direct observation of the events being studied and interviews of the person 
involved in the events,” (Yin 2003:8). 
The case study, on the surface, appears to satisfy the requirements of the IAV 
exploratory research; however, the case study has a unit of analysis issue.  An integral 
part of the case study methodology is the unit of analysis which defines “what the case 
is,” (Yin 2003:22).  The unit of analysis defines “what is actually measured or studied to 
test the hypothesis and it is not the variable being studied,” (Sirkin 2006:25).  The IAV 
exploratory research looks to uncover the unit of analysis attribute and therefore no unit 
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 of analysis has yet been established.  The resulting lack of a unit of analysis precludes a 
case study as the methodology. The importance of selecting the correct methodological 
strategy to establish fruitful research can be identified by the research question that needs 
to be answered.  
Methodology Approach 
Selecting the correct methodological approach for researching the IAV 
methodology requires a look at measurement.  A measurable scale “assigns numbers to 
some characteristic of an observation according to a set of rules,” (Porter and Hamm 
1986:5).  Measurement can be defined as a numerical representation of length, or width, 
“but also other simpler actions such as assignment of a person to particular category of a 
variable, to include somewhat different things-assignment by category,” (Sirkin 2006:34).  
IAV relies on the quantification of the complex and unpredictable behavior of human 
beings.  Quantitative consists of a measurable quantity, such as height or weight or 
temperature, and complex human behaviors are not well captured by quantitative 
techniques (Moore 1969:26; Stevens 2007).  Qualitative research “assigns [data] to 
categories that do not imply quantities” much like for unpredictable behavior such as an 
“opinion,” (Moore 1969:5).  Understanding the measurement characteristics of a 
qualitative approach over a quantitative approach is appropriate to determine the most 
effective methodological approach.  
The research goal has the characteristics of exploration, description, explanation, 
and development of categorization theory for the IAV model.  These identified 
characteristics are perhaps the antithesis of the quantitative approach, as illustrated in 
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 Table 2; however, these same characteristics lend themselves very well to the qualitative 
research approach.  The Leedy and Ormrod expressed qualitative description addresses 
many of the criteria necessary for the IAV methodology. 
Table 2. Characteristics of Approaches (Leedy and Ormrod 2005:96) 
Question Quantitative Qualitative 
What is the purpose of the 
research 
To explain and predict  
To confirm and validate 
To test theory 
To describe and explain 
To explore and interpret 
To build theory 
What is the nature of the 
research process? 
Focused 
Known variables 
Established guidelines 
Predetermined methods 
Somewhat context-free 
Detached view 
Holistic 
Unknown variables 
Flexible guidelines 
Emergent methods 
Context-bound 
Personal view 
What are the data like, and 
how are they collected? 
Numeric data 
Representative, large sample 
Standardized instruments 
Textual and/or image-based data 
Informative, small sample 
Loosely structure or non-
standardized observations and 
interviews 
How are data analyzed to 
determine their meaning? 
Statistical analysis 
Stress on objectivity 
Deductive reasoning 
Search for themes and categories 
Acknowledge that analysis is 
subjective and potentially biased 
Inductive reasoning 
How are the findings 
communicated? 
Numbers 
Statistics, aggregated data 
Formal voice, scientific style  
Words 
Narratives, individual quotes 
Personal voice, literary style 
 
Of the five reasons identified for performing qualitative research, the ones with 
the most relevance to researching the IAV methodology are “to understand a new or little 
understood problem,” “the nature of the research problem,” and “to provide 
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 understanding of the details in complex phenomena that cannot be easily conveyed with 
quantitative methodology,” (Strauss and Corbin 1990).  These first two reasons for 
qualitative research are related to the previously addressed issue with the IAV 
methodology being a new research area with little or no current research body of 
knowledge.  The last reason for qualitative research is directly related to the 
quantification of human behavior where “reality is not easily divided into discrete, 
measurable [quantitative] variables,” (Leedy and Ormrod 2005:96).  The exploratory 
nature of explaining the IAV methodology lends itself to an approach utilizing 
“measurement instruments (e.g. interviews), categories (variables) emerging from the 
data, leading to “context-bound” information, patterns, and/or theories that help to 
explain the phenomena under study,” (Leedy and Ormrod 2005:95).  Understanding the 
measurement characteristic of a qualitative approach over quantitative approach is most 
appropriate “when little information exists on a topic, when variables are unknown, when 
a relevant theory base is inadequate or missing, [and] a qualitative study can help define 
what is important—that is, what need s to be studied,” (Leedy and Ormrod 2005:95). 
Methodology Application 
Research into the IAV process relies heavily on quantification of human behavior 
and development of a new research area.  These two situations compel the research to 
deviate from commonly accepted and overly structured research methodologies.  The 
most appropriate methodology is an exploratory methodological strategy and a hybrid 
approach by taking the most beneficial portions from other methodologies with a 
qualitative approach.  As illustrated in Figure 6, this research has been conducted in the 
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 multi-phase of a qualitative case study approach: Focus and Design, Prepare and Collect 
Data, and Analysis and Findings (Patton 1990:139; Leedy and Ormrod 2005:68).  
 
Figure 6. Methodological Application 
 
 
 
Focus and Design 
The focus and design stage is predominantly concerned with defining the purpose 
of, establishing a design for, and development of investigative questions for, the topic 
area of research.   
This thesis engages with the research question, “What is the process for 
attributing value to an InfoA?”  The goal of this research is to provide a better 
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 understanding of how the process of valuation occurs and the results utilized for 
application against the valuation of InfoAs.  An understanding of the valuation process 
will help to identify factors, or qualitative measures, and enable a standard comparison 
scale for different InfoAs.  The underlying general question is “how is this asset valuation 
important?”  Understanding the valuation process and being able to apply measures of 
importance to InfoAs will provide powerful leverage for planning-to-execution decision 
makers.  Additionally, the quantifiable value, or criticality, of InfoAs will provide 
decision makers with the ability to determine what assets to protect, conserve, enhance, 
and even disregard. 
As previously discussed, the IAV methodology research has been performed as a 
hybrid of the most beneficial parts of other methodologies that emphasize a qualitative 
approach.  The methodological approach may best be described as a qualitative 
phenomenological study where the study “attempts to understand people’s perspectives, 
and understanding of a particular situation,” (Patton 1990:139; Leedy and Ormrod 
2005:68), such as in understanding an individual’s perspective on valuation of an InfoA. 
Development of a potential solution for the IAV methodology has been 
accomplished through the following research and investigative questions: 
R.  What is the process for attributing value to an information asset? 
1. What is an information asset (InfoA)? 
2. Can qualitative factors establish value? 
3. Can a single value be established for an information asset? 
4. Can one information asset have different values? 
5. Are academic discipline models adaptable to information asset valuation? 
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 Prepare and Collect Data 
In this stage the three potential qualitative approaches to preparation and 
collection of data are “in-depth open-ended interviews, direct observations, and written 
documents,” (Patton 1990:10).  The research began with investigative subject matter 
expert interviews from both the private and military sectors to outline potential written 
documentation sources.  Important at this stage, was seeking out multiple and varying 
areas of research, such as the accounting, legal, and military disciplines.  The processes 
examined needed to have subjective but defensible qualitative methodologies for 
potential adaptation to the IAV methodology.  Documentary research was conducted of 
contemporary statutory, policy, procedural and guidance material with the focus for 
uncovering potential IAV model categories, factors, and patterns. 
Analysis and Findings 
The final stage allowed synthesizing of patterns through “inductive reasoning, 
sorting and categorizing [data, until] gradually boiling it down to a small set of abstract 
factors” that influence the quantification of value (Leedy and Ormrod 2005:150).  
Utilizing the “interpretive procedures of coding categories are used to arrive at findings,” 
theories, or frameworks for IAV (Strauss and Corbin 1990:20). 
Chapter Summary 
The methodological strategy, approach, application, of the research were 
discussed in this chapter.  The research methodology accounts for the need to quantify 
subjective human behavior through qualitative measures and the need for an exploratory, 
investigative approach to uncover aspects of InfoA valuation.  A hybrid methodological 
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strategy and approach have been utilized to balance the positives and negatives of other 
methodologies.  The exploratory IAV methodology research focuses on a qualitative 
hybrid methodology for quantification of human valuation behavior.  
 
 IV. Results and Analysis 
Chapter Overview  
This chapter focuses on the analysis of the research body to elicit an answer to the 
research question.  Specifically, this analysis looks at the process for attributing value to 
an information asset and the underlying investigative questions.  This chapter covers the 
analysis of the potential IAV methodology and the contributing subjective qualitative 
measures utilized in existing methodological approaches that may be adaptable to the 
IAV methodology, as illustrated in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7. Existing Methodology Adaptation Model 
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 Analysis of Value Subjectivity 
Value analysis requires the qualitative measurement of human behavior and is 
therefore subjective.  The current physical and quantitative method of valuation does not 
take into account information and is therefore not capable of fully capturing the value of 
InfoAs.  These InfoAs are growing throughout the cyber environment and their very 
existence enables the mission to be accomplished.  This subjectivity naturally requires the 
establishment of a valuation methodology that will ensure credibility in the InfoAs.  The 
trust must be seated in the subjective category estimations which will build the InfoA 
value construct.  Ultimately, the decision makers whom need this critical InfoA value 
input must rely on the underlying defensible methodology; moreover, this methodology 
must be as near a fact-based methodology of value estimation as may be developed.  
Without a defensible methodology, decision makers will not have trust in the valuation 
process and would surely be inclined to simply make their own estimations based upon 
their own beliefs and not the established, documented valuation estimations. 
Adaptation of Other Methodologies 
An examination of the three disciplines, accounting, legal, and military, revealed 
methodological commonalities of pre-planning, documentation, qualitative measure 
categories (QMC), and subject matter expert (SME) to provide a defensible methodology 
for adaptation to the IAV methodology.  Pre-planning may be characterized as a 
deliberate forethought about how the process will provide for the needs of the users for 
that process.  Pre-planning is also the development of qualitative measures that will be 
necessary in execution of the process and development of a plan prior to a need for the 
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 process.  Documentation is an extension of the pre-planning step through personnel 
writing down the plan, communicating the plan to others, and providing a source and 
resource for users of the process in decision making capacity.  The qualitative measure 
definition is both the qualitative measure category with associated definition and the 
subjectivity of the category with associated definition.  An example of the qualitative 
measure categories with definitions may be seen in the CNSI categories.  CNSI utilizes 
the three levels of Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential with associated definitions such 
as “shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably 
could be expected to cause exceptionally grave, serious, or cause damage to the national 
security,” (EO13292 2003:15315-9).  The second part of qualitative measure definition is 
the subjectivity of the measure and definition.  The qualitative measures of the BCE 
planned work order management methodology highlights subjective category definitions 
needing human estimation such as “the planner determines,” (AFI32-1001 2005:5).  Also 
found in the CNSI methodology are the subjective qualitative measure definitions with 
vague phrases which lend themselves to individual interpretation, such as “reasonably 
could be,” or “cause serious damage,” (EO13292 2003:15315-9).  In the context of the 
reviewed processes, the SME is the individual, or group, that has gained enough 
experience from the pre-planning, documentation, and use of the qualitative measurement 
categories as to provide comprehensive and competent estimation or judgment.  In 
example with the CNSI, the SME classification authority is expected to judge the 
definition of “cause serious damage” based on experience and knowledge of the subject.  
A defensible methodology is a requirement to establish trust in the results of the model 
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 and for users of the model to have faith in the model.  In example, the EES process 
represents the application of subjective qualitative measures on human behavior through 
development of comparable standards on personnel behaviors.  The defensibility of a 
methodology is underscored to users of the methodology through a culmination of pre-
planning, documentation, subjective qualitative measure categories, and SME. 
Methodology Commonalities 
An analysis of the disciplines, all of which have developed over time, 
demonstrated similar characteristics in establishing credibility.  The credibility of the 
methodology is exemplified by the discipline accepting or recognizing the results of the 
discipline process.  These characteristics form the adaptation criteria that may be utilized 
to form a solid foundation of credibility in the IAV methodology.  Methodological 
commonalities derived from the reviewed discipline processes, such as pre-planning, 
documentation, qualitative measure categories (QMC), subject matter expert (SME) and 
defensible methodology are illustrated in Table 3.   
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 Table 3. Methodology Commonalities 
(Accounting) 
Private 
Sector 
Processes 
Pre-
Planning 
Document- 
ation 
(QMC) 
Qualitative 
Measurement 
Categories 
(SME) 
Subject 
Matter 
Expert 
Defensible 
Methodology
Bad Debt X X X X X 
FMV X X   X X 
Goodwill X X   X X 
Investment X X   X X 
R&D X X   X X 
SA X X   X X 
Software X X   X X 
Trademarks X X X X X 
(Legal) 
Private 
Sector 
Pre-
Planning 
Document- 
ation QMC SME 
Defensible 
Methodology
Damages X X X X X 
Infringement X X X X X 
Trade Secrets X X  X X 
Military 
Sector 
Processes 
Pre-
Planning 
Document- 
ation QMC SME 
Defensible 
Methodology
BCE X X X X X 
Comm X     X X 
EES X X X X X 
InfoClas X X X X X 
OPSEC X X X X X 
ORM X X X X X 
UJTL X X   X X 
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 Pre-planning 
Pre-planning may be characterized as investing forethought into the possible 
needs of the process users, development of what-if situations likely to be handled by the 
process, and documentation creation supporting the process.  Moreover, preplanning 
allows for the creation of qualitative measures, development of subject matter experts, 
and most importantly, the realization that a defensible methodology has been established 
to provide faith in the process.  The pre-planning allows for planners to have a situational 
awareness prior to any need for the process, such as with trouble tickets and work order 
management, where pre-planning enables personnel to prioritize the jobs. 
Pre-planning is vital to both the accounting and legal disciplines as much because 
these have developed over time as to the need for practical answers when the situations 
undoubtedly arise.  Accounting has the advantage of history, but taken on the whole, 
accounting demonstrates a methodical approach to pre-planning as seen in each of the 
reviewed disciplines.  The accounting history has allowed the development of a body of 
pre-planners, with organizations such as the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA), (AICPA 2007), Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), 
(FASB141 2001),  and Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB), (GASB 
2007).  Similar to accounting, the legal discipline has the advantage of historic pre-
planning refinement as seen in the each of the reviewed areas.  The law also has the 
advantage of many pre-planning support organizations such as the American Bar 
Association (ABA), (ABA 2007), American Bar Association Judicial Division (ABAJD), 
(ABAJD 2007), and Federal Bar Association (FBA), (FBA 2007). 
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 Within the military discipline, each example utilized in pre-planning is achieved 
by defining the qualitative categories with threshold measures prior to their use by SME 
in the respective process.  The principle of pre-planning is best captured by ORM as a 
“deliberate process of thorough hazard identification and risk assessment” requiring 
forethought and planning to achieve (AFPAM90-902 2000:12).   
Documentation  
Documentation, as a natural following step or extension of the pre-planning step, 
provides users of the process with a source and resource when developing decisions from 
a given process.  Moreover, documentation provides the ability to determine if a 
valuation method remains high-quality over time and allows institutional learning and 
refinement of the assessment process.  A benefit of documentation resources is the 
establishment of accountability by personnel, organizations, and entities within the 
process.  The accounting discipline has many forms of documentation originating both 
from government agencies and governing bodies such as the IRS or FASB.  Additionally, 
the previously discussed accounting associations such as AICPA or GAAP provide 
guidance for the accounting discipline.  Similarly, in the legal discipline, documents such 
as the UCC and USC provide governance but the legal associations, such as ABA and 
FBA, provide governance.  Each of the military methodologies evaluated had associated 
documentation guidance from the DoD, Joint, or AF communities. 
Qualitative Measure Categories (QMC)  
The qualitative measure definition is both the qualitative measure category with 
associated definition and the subjectivity of the category with associated definition.  Two 
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 examples of qualitative measures in the accounting discipline come from receivables for 
bad debt and trademark, both of which utilize statistical calculation to establish value 
over time.  In these two accounting instances the subjective measure definition is defined 
by buyers and sellers whom may or may not have the knowledge and experience to create 
effective estimations.  The legal discipline utilizes qualitative categories that appear 
quantitative on the surface but in practice establish a subjective value within a spectrum, 
such as with the USC statement, “not less than $750 or more than $30,000,” (USC17 
2000).  The military exhibits qualitative measure categories with definitions as seen in the 
CNSI categories of Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential with associated definitions, such 
as “shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably 
could be expected to cause exceptionally grave [serious, or cause] damage to the national 
security,” (EO13292 2003:15315-9).  Each methodology reviewed contained qualitative 
measure categories with or without documented definitions.  
The second part of qualitative measure definition is the subjectivity of the 
measure and definition.  In accounting, the trademark provides substantial subjectivity in 
the definition as “how much the owner of the trade name [would] pay to keep the name,” 
(Hitchner 2003:80).  The subjectivity in legal terms is demonstrated with trademarks, 
where the “judge at court discretion, enters a sum as the court shall find to be just,” 
(USC15 2000:1).  The military qualitative measures of BCE planned work order 
management highlights subjective category definitions needing human estimation such as  
“reduces operational effectiveness”, “give adequate security”, “breakdown of essential 
operating”, or “qualifying for higher priority”; additionally, the direct schedule work 
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 emergency category demonstrates the subjective nature of the measurement with 
“reduces operational effectiveness,” (AFI32-1001 2005:5).  The HTTM qualitative 
measures are driven by the user impact related to an outage or degradation of the service 
that calls for estimation by the commander, work center, and customer.  The EES system 
illustrates qualitative measurement categories with subjectivity such as “consider 
adapting,” “consider dress and appearance,” “above average,” or “clearly exceeds,” 
(AFForm910 2007; AFForm911 2007; AFForm931 2007; AFForm932 2007).  In the 
CNSI methodology, qualitative measures can easily be seen as subjective with vague 
phrases such as “reasonably could be,” or “cause serious damage” which lend themselves 
to individual interpretation (EO13292 2003:15315-9).  The qualitative measurement 
categories definitions of ORM demonstrate subjectivity with phrases such as “major or 
minor mission degradation,” or “negligible loss,” (AFPAM90-902 2000:17).  HTTM and 
OPSEC are similar in that each has qualitative measure categories but both rely on the 
commander and work center or staff planning team (AFI10-701 2007:12) to set priorities, 
assignments, and response times (AFI33-115V1 2006:48) of the category definitions.  
Lastly, UJTL has qualitative measure categories with associated definitions and measures 
of performance, such as “excess” and “capable” relying on the commander’s 
determination of that performance (CJCSM3500.04D 2005:C80).  
Subject Matter Expert (SME) 
In the context of the reviewed processes, the Subject Matter Expert (SME) is the 
individual, or group, whom has gained enough experience from the pre-planning, 
documentation, and use of the qualitative measurement categories to provide 
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 comprehensive and competent estimation or judgment.  Accountants are the SME where 
“valuation is an art, not a science” and this is embraced by the FASB.  Relief from 
royalty and investment value each rely upon the knowledge of a SME to establish value, 
such as the SME 5-year benefit projection for relief from royalty or the SME investor 
estimation of open market (Hitchner 2003).  In each of these valuation instances, a 
reliance on the experience and knowledge SME is used to establish a legitimate value.  
The SME estimation of an intangible asset appears in the R&D value “as an educated 
guess,” (Roche 2005).  The receivable for bad debt approach presents the most 
quantitative model by refining a value with statistical estimation becoming more accurate 
as time elapses (King 2006).  This same methodology could be adapted to IAV model 
with the SME estimating the initial value, and then statistically updating over time to 
increase the value accuracy.  The idea of an SME is not new as in financial accounting 
“the appraiser makes the assumption” and “determining value for intangible assets 
requires judgment of professional,” (King 2002).  To further the point, in financial 
accounting the Federal Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has specified that appraisers 
should determine the intangible asset by having the appraiser estimate the intangible 
asset’s actual worth (King 2002).  Many SMEs exist in the legal discipline where it may 
be the judge or jury whom make estimations.  The AF EES relies heavily upon the 
supervisor as the SME to pass judgment on the personnel under his or her supervision.  
The commander or staff brings the experience and skill to make estimations in BCE-
WOM, HTTM, OPSEC, or UJTL processes.  In the CNSI model, the classification 
authority as the SME applies experience and judgment on information to establish 
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 information classification guidelines.  The cornerstone of ORM risk assessment is the use 
of “estimation” and “intuition” to establish a standard of risk for hazards, such as 
“consider expert opinion and intuition,” “my experienced NCOs feel that there is a real 
danger of the machine falling,” and “my gut feeling is that there is a real possibility we 
could lose control of this machine and topple it,” (AFPAM90-902 2000:87, A83).   
Defensible Methodology 
A defensible methodology is a requirement to establish credibility in the results of 
the discipline process.  The reviewed disciplines of accounting, legal and military have 
developed their assessment methodologies over time to establish a defensible 
methodology as accepted by the discipline.  As demonstrated by the reviewed discipline 
methodologies, a defensible methodology may be viewed as the recognition or 
acceptance of the processes’ results by the discipline.  Business buyers and sellers accept 
the discipline’s subjective accounting method of valuation as attested with the multitude 
of transactions occurring daily.  Within the legal discipline, litigation is settled every day, 
demonstrating a measure of the acceptance by the discipline and users of the process.  
The EES process best represents the application of subjective qualitative measures on 
human behavior through development of comparable standards for application against 
personnel behaviors; moreover, the supervisor has subjective measures that attribute 
confidence in the appropriate application of those qualitative measures on human 
behavior.  The military discipline’s acceptance of the EES as a subjective, but trusted, 
methodology is seen in the daily use by Airman of all ranks.  Each of the disciplines 
reviewed has developed their subjective valuation methodologies over a period of time 
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 and the culmination of pre-planning, documentation, subjective qualitative measure 
categories, and SME establishes within the discipline a processes’ defensible 
methodology.  
Proposed Information Asset Valuation (IAV) Methodology 
This section will cover the IAV methodology proposal resulting from the research 
analysis.  The quantification of InfoAs is a multi-step methodology including: the 
information asset (InfoA), developing factors, scaling factors, aggregating factor values, 
aggregating across InfoA values, and binding InfoA value to mission impact.  The IAV 
conceptual model overview is illustrated in Figures 8 and 9, which demonstrates the pre-
cursor, qualitative factor, and assignment of InfoA value processes.  The pre-cursor 
functions of InfoA recognition and mapping are defined in the CIMIA program.  As 
illustrated in Figure 8, the IAV model accounts for the recognition of an unknown, but 
presumably large, number of InfoAs.  Each of the InfoAs will output the InfoA factor 
value mixture with a single Tactical InfoA value that is comparable to other differing 
InfoAs.  Likewise, Figure 9 illustrates that many InfoA values will output from the 
Tactical level to the Operational level where the IAV model is applied to compare 
differing InfoAs.  As the Operational values output to the Strategic level, again the IAV 
model is applied to compare the many differing InfoAs.  The Figure 9 illustration 
indicates a single flow direction, however, if the IAV model perspectives discussed later 
are introduced this graphic become bi-directional.  A pre-defined organizational InfoA 
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 value may be applied at the strategic level and flow back to operational and then tactical 
for a single InfoA value across the domains. 
 
Figure 8. IAV Model of InfoA Factor Mixture 
 
 
 
Figure 9. IAV Methodology 
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 IAV Model Qualitative Factors 
The quantification of an InfoA is a multi-step methodology.  The method steps 
are: developing factors, scaling factors, aggregating factor values, and aggregating across 
InfoA values.  After the pre-cursor steps of InfoA identification and mapping, the first 
step of the IAV model is determining the qualitative factors needed to quantify an InfoA 
value.  Accessibility, availability, confidentiality, contextual, essentiality, integrity, non-
repudiation, substitution, and temporal all appear to be factors for establishing the value 
of an InfoA, specifically InfoA 1, as illustrated in Figure 10.  Field survey and testing 
will be necessary to validate the usefulness of the factors under realistic circumstances. 
 
Figure 10. Example of an Information Asset, InfoA 1 
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 Accessibility 
The accessibility factor is characterized by the question, how easily can I get use 
of this asset?  In the Figure 10 illustration of InfoA 1, the law enforcement officer may be 
dispatched to an area with intermittent dead zone coverage resulting in the sporadic MDT 
accessibility of the network (link A). 
Availability 
The availability factor is characterized by the question, how often can I get use of 
this asset?  In the Figure 10 illustration of InfoA 1, the law enforcement officer may 
occasionally experience network saturation resulting in a sporadic ability to communicate 
with dispatch (CDT1). 
Confidentiality 
The confidentiality factor is characterized by the questions, would exposure be 
detrimental?  In the Figure 10 illustration of InfoA 1, the law enforcement officer may 
have some reason that the information communicated using the MDT should be kept 
secret from exposure to others. 
Contextual 
The contextual factor is characterized by the question, who and how is the asset 
used?  The contextual nature of an InfoA is an elusive factor.  In the Figure 10 InfoA 1 
illustration, one contextual requirement for a law enforcement officer is to communicate 
vitally important information using the MDT such as when conducting a traffic stop on a 
murder suspect vehicle.  In this case it is vital for the officer to have access to the vehicle 
and criminal databases (VDb, and SCDb) for inquiry and determination that the vehicle 
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 they have stopped is considered armed and dangerous.  In a low criticality context, the 
law enforcement officer may notify dispatch (CDT1) of a lunch break.  A staggering 
number of context situations may exist, and context assists in prioritization of the InfoA 
value.  
Essentiality 
The essentiality factor is characterized by the question, can I function without it?  
In the Figure 10 illustration of InfoA 1, the nature of a law enforcement officer’s duties 
requires the ability to communicate with the dispatch (CDT1) on-demand. 
Integrity 
The integrity factor is characterized by the question; can the communicated 
information be corrupted?  In the Figure 10 InfoA 1 illustration, corrupted dispatch 
(CDT1) communication to the MDT may prevent the law enforcement officer from 
responding to an emergency or correct location.  
Non-repudiation 
The non-repudiation factor is characterized by the questions, is this really the 
originator?  In the Figure 10 illustration of InfoA 1, dispatch (CDT1) needs to know that 
the information being communicated is actually from an authorized law enforcement 
MDT.  Questionable communication, real or perceived, may prevent the appropriate 
response to an emergency.  
Substitutability 
The substitutability factor is characterized by the questions, is there an alternative 
source?  In the Figure 10 illustration of InfoA 1, the law enforcement officer may have a 
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 personal cell phone or may be able to locate a nearby house or business with a phone that 
provides an alternate means to contact dispatch (CDT1).  
Temporal 
The temporal factor is characterized by the questions, how does the importance of 
the information change as a function of time?  The temporal nature of the InfoA changes 
and represents the most elusive of the factors.  As illustrated by InfoA 1 of Figure 10, the 
requirement for a law enforcement officer to communicate with the dispatch (CDT1) can 
change from moment to moment.  One moment, the officer may be monitoring the flow 
of traffic through a busy intersection.  The next instant, the officer may observe a major 
accident and need to immediately request fire and medical rescue units be dispatched to 
the scene.  
IAV Model Factor Scale 
The next step after identification of the factors is to apply quantification scale that 
relates the factors’ importance to the mission impact.  One requirement of the scale is that 
it must be easy to understand and utilize.  Simplicity of the scale is necessary because 
human interaction, such as manual input, will be part of the process with or without 
automation.  For example, computer antivirus software has become increasingly 
automatic but for the antivirus software to work effectively human interaction is still 
required during the configuration and input processes.  The commonly utilized Likert 
scale may be the most effective for ease of use and understanding in IAV scaling levels 
as illustrated in Figure 11.  An effective Likert scale may have these levels: 1 – Non-
Critical Impact, 2 – Low Impact, 3 – Moderate Impact, 4 – High Impact, 5 – Critical 
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 Impact.  Factor field testing will be necessary to validate the most effective factor scaling 
model as Critical Impact may not work as effectively with the Accessibility as it does 
with the Substitutability factor.  
 
Figure 11. Example IAV Model Factor Scale 
IAV Model Aggregation  
The goal of IAV is to derive a single comprehensive value for the InfoA.  Since 
there is more than one factor, the factors themselves need to be aggregated into a single 
InfoA value.  Additionally, as multiple single value InfoAs filter from the tactical to the 
operational and finally the strategic domain, the InfoA aggregation allows for 
equivalency comparisons during prioritization efforts by decision makers.  
InfoA Aggregation Without Weight 
The straight forward derivation may be achieved through an averaging of factors 
method.  This basic averaging method establishes a situation where all the factors are an 
equal weighted value at all times and in all situations.  The simple averaging method does 
not work in a situation where the SME determines that one or more of the factor values 
should be ranked higher than all other factors for a given mission.  A small example of a 
temporal factor may be seen in catching a plane at the terminal where the time a plane 
departs is more important than the other factors because these other factors are assumed 
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 to be previously satisfied.  From previous discussion, the potentially higher than average 
significance of the temporal and contextual factors may require a weighting method 
which will better reflect the organization’s canonical InfoA criticality value.  In the case 
for an InfoA, the separate factor values calculated to a single InfoA value with simple 
averaging methods is demonstrated in Table 4.  The simple averaging methodology of the 
factor value mixture for InfoA calculates to an overall InfoA value of 3 for a Moderate 
Impact to the mission.  
Table 4. InfoA Aggregation Within Factor Values Without Weight 
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InfoA 1   1 4 1 5 2 4 1 4 5 3 
 
InfoA Aggregation With Weight 
Similar to a project management screening matrix (Gray and Larson 2003:41) the 
weighted calculation takes into account a higher importance for the contextual and 
temporal factors as illustrated in Table 5.  
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 Table 5. InfoA Aggregation Within Factor Values With Weight 
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Weight 1 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 5   
InfoA 1*   1 4 1 5 2 4 1 4 5 3 
InfoA 1   1 4 1 15 2 4 1 4 15 4 
* Weights not included in calculation; 
  for visual comparison           
 
 
 
A formula calculation such as illustrated in Table 6 (Meredith and Mantel 
2006:385), may provide the necessary accuracy of value without overly complex 
mathematics.  The essence of this weighted formula is to add the non-weighted individual 
factor values to the weighted individual factor values and then divide by the total number 
of factor instances.  This formula maintains the 0-5 scale while taking into account the 
higher weight of certain individual factors and in this way maintains the single 
comparable value concept of the IAV model.  In concept, Table 5 demonstrates, forgoing 
the underlying mathematics, the overall InfoA value with weights resulting in a 4 – High 
Impact to the mission instead of a less accurate 3 – Significant Impact.  In the scope of 
this scenario, and in the broader context of real application, the weighted value may more 
accurately represent the mission impact for the users of this IAV model. 
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 Table 6. InfoA Aggregation Weighted Formula (Meredith and Mantel 2006:385) 
V =  f + FW    T 
V = InfoA Value 
f = Factor Sum 
F = Weighted Factor Sum 
W = Weight 
T = Total Factor Instances 
 
 
 
Aggregation Across InfoA Values 
The goal of IAV is to provide the ability to establish the value, as a single 
expression, for an InfoA for comparison.  InfoAs will exist in the tactical, operational, 
and strategic domains.  Tactical being the lowest level will establish an initial InfoA 
value from either an organization or individual perspective.  Each of these levels will 
have multiple InfoAs to value, compare, and prioritize.  After the tactical level prioritizes 
the differing InfoAs, the values will pass up to the operational level.  The operational 
level, like the tactical, will have multiple InfoAs to value, compare, and prioritize before 
passing the values up to the strategic level.  Finally, the strategic level will also have 
multiple InfoAs to value, compare, and prioritize.  At each level a factor valuation will 
aggregate to derive a single InfoA value that is passed up to the next level.  The end 
result is that a low level InfoA will bubble up to the strategic level for decision making.  
Table 7 illustrates a tactical, operational, or strategic level InfoA prioritized listing with 
InfoA 1 having the lowest value of 1 – Non-Critical Impact, and InfoA 5, or InfoA 6 with 
weights, having the highest value of 5 – Critical Impact. 
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 Table 7. Aggregation Across Multiple InfoAs 
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   1 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 5   
InfoA 1*   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
InfoA 2*   1 1 1 1 3 4 1 1 5 2 
InfoA 3*   1 1 2 2 2 4 5 5 5 3 
InfoA 4*   3 3 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 4 
InfoA 5*   5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
InfoA 6*  2 4 1 5 2 4 3 4 5 4 
InfoA 6  2 4 1 25 2 4 3 4 25 5 
* Weights not included in calculation; 
  for visual comparison 
 
 
 
The example of Table 7 will immediately identify for planners and decision 
makers the need to manage, protect, or exploit InfoA 5 in execution of the mission.  
Assuming that weights have been utilized in the initial InfoA valuation, a weight system 
may not be necessary at the level where aggregation across multiple InfoA takes place.  
However, an important key to this methodology is providing an adjustment mechanism 
along the hierarchal path.  From the tactical to strategic level, personnel will need to 
modify what they judge to be an inaccurate value because personnel may not have 
enough knowledge about a specific InfoA for accurate judgments, personnel may not 
have enough time to comprehensively deal with the InfoA value, or personnel may need 
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 to simply rectify a system anomaly.  The action taken could be a simple plus up or down 
of the factor values or the overall value.   
IAV Model Binding to CIMIA 
Binding the IAV model to the CIMIA program equates to linking the InfoA value 
to the mission impact alerts and linking the temporal aspects of mission executing.  The 
preceding steps of the IAV model have established a value for the InfoA in an abstract.  
The “mission binding construct reflects the criticality of the InfoA to the organization’s 
mission,” (Fortson 2007:192) through a user friendly visual and effect on the mission of a 
period of time.  This final step of the IAV model binds for IAV model presentation and 
time-cycles to the CIMIA program. 
Binding Presentation 
The importance of InfoA value becomes more apparent for planners and decision 
makers with the incorporation of other attributes in a visual presentation.  In example, the 
InfoA value of 5 – Critical Impact takes on more meaning when the InfoA is bound to 
other attributes such as the problem of “circuit 7JA is down,” the mission description of 
“ATO generation capability for theater-wide refueling,” the InfoA status of “technicians 
are troubleshooting,” and that an alternative “dial-up circuit 9D72 at degraded speed” 
exists.  Specifying the problem, mission description, status, alternatives, and a visual 
display as illustrated in Figure 12, represents a rudimentary culmination of these 
additional attributes supporting the InfoA value represented by the alert banner.   
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Figure 12. Conceptual CIMIA Visual 
 
 
 
In step with the CIMIA goal to provide a DSS that is naturally intuitive for 
personnel to understand and utilize, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
development of the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) (DHS 2008) has 
presentation characteristics similar to the CIMIA presentation requirements.  From 
frequent public exposure, the HSAS should have a broad range of familiarity to the 
personnel utilizing the CIMIA DSS tool which will ease utilization and foster acceptance.  
Borrowing from the HSAS scheme as an overlay for Figure 11, a new IAV model factor 
scale presentation binding is created as illustrated in Figure 13.  
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Figure 13. IAV Example Value Scale with Criticality 
 
 
 
Binding Time Cycles 
The main CIMIA presentation window will provide a concise level of information 
for planners and decision makers, however lower drill-down levels will be necessary to 
add more detail information.  One level of drill-down will be the graphic time cycle 
relationship of an InfoA to mission criticality over a specified time period for mission 
planning projections.  Figures 14, 15, and 16 illustrate the InfoA-to-mission-impact of a 
30-day cycle, or an average month. 
The first criticality example, Figure 14, is straight forward with a low InfoA 
value, or criticality.  The criticality is low and flat, rapidly increases during an eight day 
peak, and then returns to low and flat criticality.  This InfoA is, from a decision maker’s 
perspective, is valuable for only a short period of the month, but has significant temporal 
importance when the InfoA is being utilized.  
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Figure 14. IAV Example Criticality Cycle 1 
 
 
 
The second criticality example, Figure 15, demonstrates a gradual growth in the 
InfoA criticality until a single day peak and then a gradual return to a low criticality.  
From a decision maker perspective, this InfoA is valuable for the entire month cycle.  
This situation would indicate to decision makers that constant vigilance in protecting the 
resource may be necessary over the time cycle. 
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Figure 15. IAV Example Criticality Cycle 2 
 
 
 
The third criticality example, Figure 16, is actually a criticality error.  The 
criticality error illustrated if Figure 16 is the mirror opposite of Figure 14 and 
demonstrates the importance of this InfoA.  During the tactical, operational, or strategic 
planning phase of a mission, the critical error graphic identifies periods when the InfoA is 
vulnerable.  This critical error graphic would indicate to planners the vital nature of this 
InfoA to the mission impact at hand, over the time cycle, and failure of the InfoA during 
the time cycle may potentially cause failure of the mission. 
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Figure 16. IAV Example Criticality Error Cycle 
 
 
 
IAV Model Comprehensive Example 
The core benefit of the IAV model is the association of mission capability to the 
InfoA, which strengthens the importance of the InfoA to the organization. In this section 
a comprehensive example will be utilized to demonstrate concepts of the IAV model.  
Refer to Figure 17, as well as following the discussion, for detail on the example scenario 
utilized throughout this section to demonstrate key IAV model concepts. 
The following comprehensive IAV model scenario example utilizes the following 
entities: 1) a law enforcement agency as the organizational owner of the entire system of 
systems, 2) a law enforcement agency system of systems, 3) a law enforcement officer 
(LEO), and 4) various day to day missions being conducted by the LEO.  
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 The law enforcement agency system of system, as illustrated in Figure 17, is 
composed of the: 1) Mobile Datalink Terminal (MDT), the lowest level interface system 
for accessing the wider system of systems through the Central Dispatch Terminal and the 
primary means for the LEO to interface with the law enforcement agency system of 
systems; 2) Central Dispatch Terminal (CDT), or CDT1, a city, municipality, or county 
level system that is able to interface with other systems within the law enforcement 
agency’s system of systems and the primary interface system for the MDT; 3) State 
Dispatch Terminal (SDT), the next higher level system above the CDT that is able to 
interface with other systems within the law enforcement agency’s system of systems; 4) 
Vehicle Database (VDb), the state database with vehicle and vehicle owner information; 
5) State Criminal Database (SCDb), the database with criminal personal information; 6) 
Central Dispatch Terminal Two (CDT2), the CDT in the adjacent city, municipality, or 
county to CDT1, 7) Air Support Datalink Terminal (ASDT), the air support link to the 
law enforcement agency’s system of systems, and 8) Links A-H, the various wired and 
wireless network connections within the law enforcement agency’s system of systems. 
The day to day missions of the LEO must be accomplished through the law 
enforcement agency’s system of systems and these mission capabilities, as illustrated in 
Table 8, are: 1) contact with the CDT, 2) vehicle license plate inquiry, 3) criminal 
inquiry, 4) request for air surveillance support, and 5) directing air surveillance support.   
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Figure 17. Example Scenario Detail 
 
Table 8. Example Scenario Detail Mission Capability 
Mission Capability 1 Contact with CDT via MDT 
Mission Capability 2 Vehicle license plate inquiry 
Mission Capability 3 Criminal inquiry 
Mission Capability 4 Request for air surveillance support 
Mission Capability 5 Directing air surveillance support 
 
 
80 
 Simple InfoA Scenario Example 
Utilizing a simple point-to-point InfoA, as illustrated in Figure 18, the three 
components of InfoA 1 (MDT, CDT1, and transmission link A) comprise the entire 
InfoA 1 and enable the mission capability 1 to be accomplished.  Figure 18, utilized in 
the following IAV model concept explanations, is provide for reader convenience, but is 
identical to previously utilized Figure 10.  The LEO has a mission requirement to contact 
CDT1 via the MDT and this could be for an unremarkable reason such as a break or a 
more important reason such as a traffic stop; moreover, the overall InfoA 1 value, as 
illustrated in Table 7, is 1 for a Low Impact.  Failure or degradation of the MDT, CDT1, 
or link A will prevent the law enforcement officer from successfully communicating with 
CDT1 as expressed in mission capability 1. 
 
Figure 18. Example of an Information Asset, InfoA 1 
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 IAV Model Perspectives 
The IAV model is frame of reference dependent.  In our example, the law 
enforcement officer has one perspective of value, but the mobile data terminal used by a 
combat soldier may have a very different perspective and value.  Another example is that 
the law enforcement officer may have a value and the law enforcement officer’s 
organization may have another value for the same InfoA.  These two examples 
demonstrate the separate prospective of organization and individual.  In example, using 
CDT1 as the organizational representative of the law enforcement agency, CDT1’s 
organizational value of InfoA 1, as illustrated in Figure 18, may be established as 5 for 
Critical Mission Impact and applied to all like InfoAs regardless of the situation.  
Moreover, the LEO as the individual, where there is a lack of an organizationally 
mandated InfoA value, may establish InfoA 1, as illustrated in Figure 18, as 3 for a 
Significant Mission Impact.  An organizational perspective is a policy-based mixture of 
factor values to arrive at a single InfoA value.  An organizational policy would most 
likely be developed from a team of personnel knowledge about the InfoA with 
management concurrence. The organization as a whole may have a defined perspective 
with the InfoA having a standard factor value mix with a standard overall value.  Table 7 
demonstrates for InfoA 1 an example standard factor mix and value that an organization 
may place on all such similar InfoAs utilized within that organization.  The policy may 
apply to a specific InfoA, or group of similar InfoAs, but ultimately provides guidance to 
all personnel interacting with the InfoA.  The organizational perspective is a prime driver 
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 for the CIMIA project, but as the IAV methodology matures, the individual value will 
become more practical and necessary. 
Complex InfoA Scenario Example 1 
Figure 19 illustrates a more complex example of an InfoA.  The four components 
of InfoA 2 (MDT, CDT1, SDT, VDb, and transmission links A, B, C) enable the mission 
capability 2 to be accomplished.  The LEO has made a traffic stop and has a requirement 
to determine who owns the vehicle; moreover, the overall InfoA value, as illustrated in 
Table 7, is 2 for a Moderate Impact.  Should a system, server, or link be in degraded or 
failure status, the LEO will be unable to conduct a license plate inquiry as expressed in 
mission capability 2. 
 
Figure 19. Example of an Information Asset, InfoA 2 
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 Complex InfoA Scenario Example 2 
Figure 20 illustrates an increasingly higher level example of a complex InfoA.  
The five components of InfoA 3 (MDT, CDT1, SDT, VDb, SCDb and transmission links 
A, B, C, D) enable the mission capability 3 to be accomplished.  During the traffic stop 
the LOE has determined the vehicle owner and has a requirement to determine if the 
owner is a criminal; moreover, the overall InfoA value, as illustrated in Table 8, is 3 for a 
Significant Impact.  Should a system, server, or link be in degraded or failure status then, 
the LEO will be unable to conduct a license plate inquiry and subsequent criminal inquiry 
as expressed in mission capability 3. 
 
Figure 20. Example of an Information Asset, InfoA 3 
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 Static vs. Dynamic InfoAs 
It is important in the comprehensive example scenario to discuss the, at least two 
possible and distinct states of InfoAs: static and dynamic.  InfoAs are composed of the 
connecting components from among the system of systems and this system of system is 
part of the real changing world in which it resides.  Therefore the system of system 
changes frequently and without warning, however there are situations where the system 
remains fixed for a period of time, such as a month, year, or decade.  These periods of 
time when the system of system experiences little change over time will be referred to as 
static.  The static state is much more easily dealt with when the existence of the InfoA is 
constant.  The static state of an InfoA is characterized by infrequent change, and when 
change does occur the change is telegraphed through the system in a way that the system 
of system is able to adapt to the change.  In example, InfoA 3 (MDT, CDT1, SDT, VDb, 
SCDb and transmission links A, B, C, D), as illustrated in Figure 20, is likely to stay in a 
constant component configuration and InfoA 3 is less likely to change significantly or 
frequently.  The stability of these InfoA components enables a static, steady state to 
emerge that fosters InfoA identification, mapping, and valuation.  The dynamic nature of 
an InfoA emerges in InfoA 4, as illustrated in Figure 12, components (MDT, CDT1, 
CDT2, ASDT, and links A, E, F, G, H), that change significantly and with great 
frequency.  The frequent change of components will necessitate more effort to track and 
understand the changes.  As previously discussed, this dynamic nature highlights the 
elusiveness of the temporal and contextual InfoA factors. 
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 Complex InfoA Scenario Example 3 
This next comprehensive scenario example demonstrates the dynamic 
requirement to satisfy the mission capability 4, the LEO needs to request air surveillance 
support.  The LEO requires air surveillance support because the traffic stop vehicle owner 
is a criminal and has fled the scene on foot.  The LEO would normally make the air 
surveillance support request via CDT1 from within the InfoA 4 (MDT, CDT1, CDT2, 
ASDT, and links A, E, F, G, H), as illustrated in Figure 21; moreover, the overall InfoA 
value, as illustrated in Table 8, is 4 for a High Impact.  A degradation or failure of 
transmission link A from within InfoA 4 necessitates the LEO to utilize CDT2 as a 
substitute.  This substitution necessitates a change from InfoA 4 to InfoA 5. 
 
Figure 21. Example of an Information Asset, InfoA 4 
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 Figure 22 illustrates a simple InfoA where substitutability may modify value.  The 
failure of InfoA 4 allows InfoA 5 to act as a substitute and the LEO to continue with the 
mission capability task.  From an organizational perspective, this substitution temporarily 
decreases the value of InfoA 4 from 4 – High Impact to a lower level of 3 – Significant 
Impact, because the organization decision makers recognize the substitute is available.  
Likewise, the InfoA 4 value is decreases because the LEO recognizes that the substitute 
is available to accomplish the mission capability task, from an individual perspective.  
The LEO is able to execute the mission capability 4 with InfoA 5 (MDT, CDT2, ASDT, 
and links G, F), which has a value of 5 – Critical Impact.  Should the InfoA 5 system or 
link be in degraded or failure status, the LEO will be unable to conduct a request for air 
surveillance support in accomplishing mission capability 4. 
 
Figure 22. Example of an Information Asset, InfoA 5 
 
Figure 23 illustrates a simple InfoA where the dynamic nature of realism 
intervenes to add weight on contextual and temporal factors.  At this point in the example 
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 scenario the LEO has a requirement to communicate and direct the actions of air 
surveillance to capture a fleeing criminal.  This dynamically changes the original value of 
InfoA 6 (MDT, ASDT, and link H), as illustrated in Table 8, of 4 for a High Impact, both 
contextually and temporally, in the accomplishment of mission capability 5.  The new 
requirement for the LEO to coordinate with air surveillance support to capture the fleeing 
criminal changes the value of InfoA 6 to, as illustrated in Table 8, 5 for a Critical Impact. 
 
Figure 23. Example of an Information Asset, InfoA 6 
 
 
 
Binding an InfoA to the CIMIA program visual presentation can be understood 
with InfoA 6.  In the final portion of the comprehensive example, InfoA 6 has a value of 
5- Critical Impact; moreover, should a component be in degraded or failure status, then 
the LEO will be unable to coordinate air surveillance support to capture the fleeing 
criminal as expressed in mission capability 5.  If InfoA 6 becomes degraded or in failure 
status the CIMIA visual presentation tool will notify CDT2 with red 5 Severe -- Critical 
Impact alert banner, similar to the illustration in Figure 12. 
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 An example of binding an InfoA to the time cycle may be understood from the 
InfoA 6 scenario.  The time cycle for InfoA 6 is measured in hourly increments, such as 
with a 24 hour clock, and represents one area along the temporal spectrum from seconds 
to multi-year.  Figure 24 illustrates that over a 24-hour time cycle, InfoA 6 is at a peak 
value of 5- Critical Impact for only a short period of two hours.  This two-hour window 
represents the part of the scenario where the LEO is coordinating air surveillance efforts 
to capture the fleeing criminal; however, the other periods of time are a steady lower 
value of 1 – Low Impact representing the non-use of the ASDT. 
 
Figure 24. Time-Cycle Binding Example 1 for InfoA 6 
 
A modification of the mission capability task for, InfoA 6 allows an illustration of 
the time binding and criticality error.  Applying a new mission capability to InfoA 6, such 
as the LEO requesting air support for escorting dignitaries through the city, allows an 
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 exhibit of time cycle binding and criticality error.  Figure 25 illustrates, over a 24-hour 
cycle, the LEO preparation slowly increases the value of InfoA 6 until a peak period 
when the LEO is escorting the dignitaries through the city and then the gradual decline of 
InfoA 6 value as the LEO conduct post activities.  This new view of time cycle binding 
demonstrates how the IAV model may translate to the realistic and dynamic environment 
of the real world.  During the planning stages of the new InfoA 6 scenario allows 
planners to visualize the potential periods when the InfoA must be maintained, bolstered, 
or prevented from failing.  Figure 26 is a mirror opposite of Figure 24 and illustrates that 
should InfoA 6 be in a degraded or failure status during the lowest point then the mission 
capability may fail.  
 
Figure 25. Time-Cycle Binding Example 2 for InfoA 6 
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Figure 26. Criticality Error Example for InfoA 6 
 
 
IAV Model Comprehensive Example Summary 
The comprehensive example has demonstrated the key IAV model concepts of 
aggregating qualitative factors to a single InfoA value, aggregation across multiple 
InfoAs, individual and organization perspectives, InfoAs that are static and dynamic, and 
binding InfoAs to the CIMIA program. 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter has sought to uncover the subjective nature of qualitative measures 
for human behavior quantification and develop commonalities among various public and 
government sector methodologies for adaptation to the IAV model.  An examination of 
existing subjective methodologies identified commonalities that demonstrate the 
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trustworthiness and defensibility the discipline processes within the respective discipline 
and these commonalities translate to proposed IAV methodology as a real possibility.  
The IAV model quantification of InfoAs is a multi-step process including: developing 
factors, scaling factors, aggregating factor values, aggregating across InfoA values, and 
binding InfoA value to mission impact alerts.  The IAV model factors of accessibility, 
availability, confidentiality, contextual, essentiality, integrity, non-repudiation, 
substitution, and temporal with the application of a criticality scale may be able define a 
single standardized value InfoAs; resulting in the ability to compare differing InfoAs 
from separate organization and units.   The further aggregation of separate InfoA value 
through the tactical, operational, and strategic domains provide critical cyber-battlespace 
awareness to decision makers.  
 V. Conclusions and Proposals 
Chapter Overview  
This chapter discusses the conclusions of the IAV methodology through the 
proposed CIMIA solutions, proposed IAV methodology, and proposed IAV 
implementation, and then addresses research limitations with future research areas.  
Proposed CIMIA Solutions 
The impetus for the IAV methodology is founded in the goals outlined by the 
CIMIA program, such as linking infrastructure to mission, near real-time incident 
notification, incident trend analysis, and predictive incident effect forecasting (Thiem 
2005; Fortson 2007).  Fortson brought CIMIA forward extensively with the development 
of the five phase mission impact assessment model.  The independent, but collaborative, 
CIMIA model functions are: 1) Information Asset Identification (IAI) is the realization 
that an information asset exists and needs to be documented; 2) Information Asset-to-
Mission Mapping (IAMM) is the process of documenting the internal and external 
connections of the information asset; 3) Information Asset Valuation (IAV) is the process 
of establishing a standardized and comparable information asset criticality value; 4) 
Damage Assessment (DA) is the presentation of cyber battlespace awareness with near 
real-time information asset status for decision makers to act upon, and 5) Damage-to-
Mission Assessment/Impact Reporting (DMAIR), is the information asset historical 
archive for trend analysis and what-if scenario forecasting (Fortson 2007).  A CIMIA 
program decision support tool may be able to bond the infrastructure-to-mission and the 
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 separate functions of communications-to-operations through single visual presentation for 
decision makers.  
The IAV methodology is the CIMIA function that connects the other functions.  
The IAV methodology enables decision makers to determine if an identified InfoA merits 
further resources to maintain, monitor, and protect.  The IAV methodology allows 
scoping InfoA mission mapping activity through determining the minimum and 
maximum number of connections; additionally, without the IAV methodology, mission 
mapping may result in analysis paralysis as all the connection possibilities are thoroughly 
researched.  The core task for CIMIA is the DA providing effective assessment 
information to decision makers and the IAV methodology with a single InfoA value at 
the heart of providing this actionable visual information to decision makers.  The IAV 
methodology, again with a single InfoA value that enables comparison across the 
spectrum of different InfoAs, enables trend analysis and future mission impact 
forecasting.  Trend analysis benefits from the ability of reviewing InfoAs over time to 
determine where costs could be saved through reduction or elimination of InfoAs; 
additionally, trend analysis benefits from identifying those InfoAs that merit more 
investment to assist in mission success.  One of the potentially more powerful IAV 
methodology functions will be a what-if forecasting capability which allows planners to 
visually identify those InfoAs with the greatest impact to mission success.  The what-if 
capability may be utilized to add or remove InfoAs from a given plan to determine the 
mission impact prior to actual implementation.  The ultimate goal for the IAV 
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 methodology is to provide foundational research solutions which may be implemented in 
the CIMIA program through a decision support tool utilized by decision makers.  
Proposed IAV Methodology 
The proposed IAV methodology covers the subjectivity of human behavior 
valuation, contributions of other disciplines, framework, and single InfoA value. 
Value is a human behavior with quantitative measurement challenges but the IAV 
methodology proposes qualitative measurement with the understood subjectivity issues.  
Complete valuation of an InfoA including the intrinsic and intangible aspects pose major 
problems for current physical-based valuation methods.  The significant growth of InfoAs 
throughout the cyber environment enables mission accomplishment but the physical 
methods need to catch up to the growth.  The IAV methodology credibility rests with the 
naturally subjective qualitative measures and how these are validated.  The reviewed 
discipline processes demonstrate a defensible methodology to be a methodology where 
practices have been validated and accepted by the discipline utilizing the methodology.  
Decision makers whom need this critical InfoA value from the DA function must be able 
to rely upon the underlying methodology; moreover, this methodology must be as near a 
fact-based methodology of value estimation as may be developed.  Without a defensible 
methodology, decision makers will not have trust in the valuation process.  The result 
may be for decision makers to rely on personal estimations based on their own beliefs 
and not the established documented valuation estimations.  
The IAV methodology proposes that the term information asset, or InfoA, is the 
convergence of information tangibles, information intangibles, and information flow to 
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 materialize as a functional entity that enhances the mission capability through physical 
and intrinsic contribution.  A common definition is the starting point for compatible 
interaction among the users of CIMIA and specifically users of the IAV methodology in 
reference to InfoA discussion. 
Contributing Disciplines 
The foundation of initial investigation into the IAV methodology is discovery 
research where analysis of other disciplines may provide answers; and, this research 
examined the three disciplines of accounting, legal, and military.  The contribution of 
these long standing disciplines and processes revealed methodological commonalities of 
pre-planning, documentation, qualitative measure categories (QMC), and subject matter 
expert (SME).  It is from these adaptation criteria that each discipline recognizes their 
processes as subjective, yet trusted, and result in a defensible methodology.  A discipline 
accepting the results of a process methodology, as demonstrated by the reviewed 
disciplines, establishes the defensibility of the methodology. 
Utilizing these same adaptation criteria, the IAV methodology research provides 
pre-planning, documentation, and QMC.  The IAV methodology research has examined 
InfoA valuation, which is just one form of forethought about the valuation topic area; 
certainly, future research will continue to contribute to the area of pre-planning.  The 
development of this research is the beginning of the documentation process.  This IAV 
methodology research has identified nine potential QMC valuation factors that are 
utilized to calculate an overall InfoA value.  IAV methodology research has identified the 
SME as those individuals with the experience and knowledge whom are currently 
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 bridging the infrastructure-to-mission gap and bonding the separate functional areas of 
communications-to-operations.  It is from these long standing discipline processes 
making use of the adaptation criteria that will enable the IAV methodology to be 
subjective, but credible, methodology. 
Framework 
The IAV framework builds from the pre-cursor, or sequential, activities of InfoA 
identification and mission mapping to development of a single InfoA value.  The SME 
applies and aggregates InfoA factors to arrive at a single value.  The IAV framework 
factors for InfoA value are: 1) Accessibility, cannot logically get to the InfoA; 2) 
Availability, can access but cannot use the InfoA; 3) Confidentiality, information 
communicated should be kept from exposure traversing the InfoA; 4) Contextual, specific 
situation or circumstances compel importance of the InfoA; 5) Essentiality, indispensable 
facilitator for executing the mission with the InfoA; 6) Integrity, information 
communicated is free from flaws though traversing the InfoA; 7) Non-repudiation, 
information communicated is actually from originator though traversing the InfoA; 8) 
Substitutability, existence of an alternate InfoA; and 9) Temporal, the effect time has on 
the effectiveness of the InfoA to execute the mission.  The commonly utilized Likert 
scale is utilized by the SME to measure the level of importance each factor contributes to 
the overall value, and the scale levels are: 1 – Non-Critical Impact, 2 – Low Impact, 3 – 
Moderate Impact, 4 – High Impact, 5 – Critical Impact.  The InfoA factor value mixture 
is the factors with applied scale, utilizing an averaging calculation establishes the single 
InfoA.   
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 The factor scale serves three purposes: 1) it is the scale for measuring each 
individual factor, 2), it is the scale for measuring the overall InfoA value calculated, and 
3) it is the scale that matches up to the CIMIA criticality alerts.  The single InfoA value is 
immediately recognizable by decision makers as the criticality of the InfoA to the 
mission impact.  Having this one scale serve all three purposes bind the IAV model to the 
CIMIA model. 
The three domains of tactical, operational, and strategic utilize the IAV 
framework to establish InfoA value for prioritization efforts.  At the initial tactical level, 
the SME attributes each factor with a value from the scale which calculates to a single 
InfoA value.  The tactical level may have more than one InfoA.  Once each InfoA has an 
established value, a prioritization is required to determine which InfoA, or InfoAs, are 
most vital to mission accomplishment.  The single InfoA value enable the tactical level to 
compare these differing InfoA based on the same measurement standards for prioritizing 
the most important InfoA.  The operational level receives InfoA values from the number 
of tactical level entities and must also prioritize these many InfoA values.  The IAV 
framework enables the operational level to utilize the same prioritization procedure as the 
tactical.  Likewise, as the many InfoA values input to the strategic level, the IAV 
framework enables prioritizing.  It is the single, comparable InfoA values of the IAV 
methodology which enables the tactical, operational, and strategic domains to prioritize 
the multitude of InfoAs. 
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 Single Comparable InfoA Value 
The IAV methodology establishes a single InfoA value which serves the purpose 
of comparison and decision maker ease of use.  Establishing a single InfoA value enables 
decision makers to compare the many differing InfoAs.  In example, InfoA 1 may be an 
aircraft intelligence system and InfoA 2 may be a computer database system, but the use 
of similar IAV framework measurement criteria allows these two different InfoAs to be 
compared based on value to the mission.  Decision makers would benefit from having a 
single, recognizable, reference value for each InfoA.  This single recognizable reference 
value for each InfoA should enable decision makers to quickly and easily understand the 
importance of relationship of this InfoA to the mission.  
Proposed IAV Implementation 
The IAV methodology would benefit, as well as provide benefit, through 
implementation in well defined work centers at the tactical and operational levels.  Some 
examples of well defined work centers are: Combined Air Operations Center, Joint Air 
Operations Center (JAOC), Air Operations Center (AOC), Battle Staff, and Command 
Post (CP).  The smaller work centers have the best chance of maintaining a nimble and 
effective IAV methodology growth in supporting decision makers, planners, and the 
overall mission.  
Limitations/Future Research 
The most appropriate method for transferring the limitations and future research 
of this thesis is through expansion of the CIMIA tool functionalities (IAI, IAMM, IAV, 
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 DA, and DMAIR) through the eyes of a planner.  A planner may be either deliberate as a 
strategic and operational planner with an operational mission plan or proactive/reactive as 
a tactical planner with an immediate surveillance air tasking order. 
The first CIMIA phase is information asset identification, or the IAI, and is the 
comprehension that an InfoA actually exists (Fortson 2007).  There is an IAV 
methodology research limitation in that it is difficult to match the IAV methodology to 
IAI without a working or absolute understanding of IAI.  An area of research that should 
be undertaken to understand, and scope, is the complexity of IAI in reference to manual 
human requirements and computer automation of this function.  Ultimately, identification 
of an InfoA is a human decision.  In a manual process the human planner will identify an 
InfoA through manual inputs to CIMIA.  Through the automation of IAMM 
functionality, discussed next, where the InfoA is automatically presented to the planner, 
the human planner will still need to confirm the validity of that InfoA.  Various reasons 
exist for a planner to reject a pre-identified InfoA with one reason being an InfoA that 
falls out of individual or organizational perspective of mission necessity.  
The second CIMIA phase is information asset mission mapping, or the IAMM, 
and is the process of documenting the internal and external connections, or linkages, of 
the identified InfoA (Fortson 2007).  From this researcher’s perspective, IAMM is one of 
the more difficult parts of CIMIA that needs to be researched and scoped.  Many network 
mapping software tools exist to map networks, servers, and data, and presumably IAMM 
will be automated to present human planners with potential InfoAs identified in the IAI 
functionality of CIMIA.  In addition to the human planner input to guide the mapping 
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 process, hopefully, human planners will be able to force the mapping as necessary where 
the automation is not capable of connecting the linkage.  Similar to IAI, there is an IAV 
methodology research limitation in that it is difficult to match the IAV methodology to 
IAMM without a working or absolute understanding of IAMM. 
The third CIMIA phase, IAV, is perhaps, the function which connects the other 
phases together.  This research into IAV methodology seeks to establish a valuation 
methodology for InfoAs that planners may trust and have faith in during the decision 
making process.  The IAV methodology puts the IAI and IAMM functions to work while 
providing vital InfoA status to the DA and DMAIR functions. 
This thesis paper’s proposed IAV methodology solution, or some variant, will 
require a Joint solution that is capable of serving beyond the DoD to a more broad 
government service on the whole for national security.  Future IAV methodology 
research into other Services (Army, Navy, Marine, and Coast Guard), government 
agencies (IRS, NSA, etc.), and public sector would be a significant contribution to the 
InfoA valuation research.  
A limitation of the IAV research, and an area for future research, is the ability to 
locate and survey the personnel who currently bridge the communications and operations 
disconnect.  A survey would be a vital tool for validating the utility of the IAV 
methodology and the IAV framework valuation factors and factor scale. Based on this 
initial research an example survey was constructed, see Appendix B (Rehg 2007).  
Locations such as Air Operations Centers (AOC), Combined Air Operation Centers 
(CAOC), Joint Air Operations Centers (JAOC) and the newly introduced Cyber 
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 Command may be readily filled with these knowledgeable personnel.  Once located, 
these knowledgeable personnel will be instrumental in validating the IAV model factors 
as well as developing refined factor consensus through a Delphi study.  The planners will 
have the cross-community knowledge, communications-to-operations, making them 
capable of deciding the InfoA factor value mixture when establishing an overall 
organizational InfoA value.  As this research has exposed the scope and limitations of 
IAV methodology, further research will be necessary to move the IAV methodology 
forward.  
The fourth CIMIA phase is damage assessment, or the DA, and is the presentation 
of cyber battlespace awareness with near real-time InfoA status (Fortson 2007).  The core 
of this function is the presentation of the InfoA status to the planner and needs to take 
into account the differing possible perspectives; moreover, the goal should be to provide 
the best possible presentation that works with the thought processes of the planner.  In the 
end, the IAV model must integrate with the planner’s working and thought processes to 
achieve maximum decision making effect with minimum time loss. 
The last CIMIA phase is the damage-to-mission assessment and impact reporting, 
or the DMAIR, and is the historical archive for trend analysis and what-if scenario 
forecasting (Fortson 2007).  Where the DA was looking at the present, DMAIR is really 
two separate functions looking at the past and future.  As CIMIA performs, over time, 
historical data will develop that will enable a trend analysis of the InfoA values and the 
resulting impact on the mission.  A future area of IAV methodology research is how to 
store the current InfoA value such that timeless retrieval and relevant display are 
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possible.  The what-if scenario development functionality, through the manipulation of 
InfoA in a degraded, failure, or battle eliminated context, will enable planners to shape 
the mission effectiveness over a given period of time prior to execution of the plan.  The 
IAV methodology would improve with further research into the effect of time on the 
dynamic nature of the IAV methodology.  
Chapter Summary 
This chapter discusses the conclusions of the IAV methodology through the 
proposed CIMIA solutions, proposed IAV methodology, and proposed IAV 
implementation, and then addresses research limitations with future research areas.  The 
IAV methodology research attempts to assist the AF and DoD with an automated DSS 
tool to provide a better understanding of the relationship between communications 
infrastructure and operations mission impact.  This research has been conducted under 
the mentorship, and benefit of, the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) CIMIA 
program.  The IAV methodology seeks to define the term information asset (InfoA) as 
the convergence of information tangibles, information intangibles, and information flow 
to materialize as a functional entity that enhances the mission capability.  The IAV model 
research attempts to quantify the InfoA through attributing factors with assigned weights 
for calculation of an overall value.  IAV research examines existing non-military and 
military valuation methodologies for adaptability to the IAV model.  The intention of this 
work is the development of foundational methodologies supporting the creation of an 
automated CIMIA DSS tool to provide near real time cyber environmental awareness for 
effective decision making prior to, during, and post cyber incident situations.  
 Appendix A: Intangible Assets Classes (FASB141 2001:28) 
1) Marketing-related intangible assets 
a) Trademarks, trade names 
b) Service marks, collective marks, certification marks 
c) Trade dress (unique color, shape, or package design)  
d) Newspaper mastheads 
e) Internet domain names 
f) Non-competition agreements 
2) Customer-related intangible assets 
a) Customer lists 
b) Order or production backlog 
c) Customer contracts and related customer relationships 
d) Non-contractual customer relationships 
3) Artistic-related intangible assets 
a) Plays, operas, ballets 
b) Books, magazines, newspapers, other literary works 
c) Musical works such as compositions, song lyrics, advertising jingles 
4) Pictures, photographs 
a) Video and audiovisual material, including motion pictures, music videos, 
television programs 
5) Contract-based intangible assets 
a) Licensing, royalty, standstill agreements 
b) Advertising, construction, management, service or supply contracts 
c) Lease agreements 
d) Construction permits 
e) Franchise agreements 
6) Operating and broadcast rights 
a) Use rights such as drilling, water, air, mineral, timber cutting, and route 
authorities 
b) Servicing contracts such as mortgage servicing contracts 
c) Employment contracts 
7) Technology-based intangible assets 
a) Patented technology 
b) Computer software and mask works 
c) Unpatented technology 
d) Databases, including title plants 
e) Trade secrets, such as secret formulas, processes, recipes 
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 Appendix B: IAV Example Survey (Rehg 2007) 
I.  Create your code. 
 
Understanding the sensitivity of maintaining your privacy, and anonymity, a disposable code will 
be generated as a marker for this survey.  The code will be used to link this survey to your 
previous or future surveys in this study.   
 
Your name and/or demographic information are NOT required on the survey for any purpose.  
Please do not provide such information. 
 
 
Your code consists of the first 2 letters of your mother and father’s first names, and the numerical 
month and day of your birthday.  An example is below: 
Example: 
 Mother’s first name:    Jane 
 Father’s first name:      John 
 Birth month and day:   January 1st (01/01) 
 
Your Code would be:  jajo0101 
 
 
After developing your unique code, write it in the boxes below, and continue to the next page. 
  
First two letters of 
Mother’s first name 
First two letters of 
Father’s first name 
Your Birth Month and Day  
(do not include the year) 
        
 
 
PRIVACY NOTICE 
In accordance with AFI 37-132, Paragraph 3.2, the following information is provided as required by the 1974 Privacy Act 
 
Authority:  10 U.S.C. 8012, Secretary of the Air Force; powers and duties; delegation by; implemented by AFI 36-2601, 
Air Force Personnel Survey Program. 
Purpose: To obtain information regarding the attitudes and knowledge of personnel enrolled in the fundamentals of 
acquisition management course, and evaluate the effectiveness of acquisition program manager education and training.    
Routine Use: A final report will be provided to AFIT/LS. No analysis of individual responses will be conducted and only 
members of the research team will be permitted access to the raw data.  Reports summarizing trends in large groups of 
people may be published. 
Participation:  Participation is VOLUNTARY.  No adverse action will be taken against any member who does not 
participate in this survey or who does not complete any part of the survey.  
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 II. Overall Information Asset Valuation (IAV) methodology.  Using the scale below, 
indicate the extent that you agree with the following statements. Use the blank space at the 
beginning of each statement to record the number of your choice. 
 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
2 
Disagree 
 
3 
Neutral 
 
4 
Agree 
 
5 
Strongly  
Agree 
 
___ 1.  I am able to understand the concept and practical application of the IAV model. 
 
___ 2.  I understand the definition of an information asset. 
 
___ 3.  I believe the IAV model will be helpful in the execution of my duties. 
 
___ 4.  I believe the IAV model is unusable in the execution of my duties. 
 
___ 5.  My performance may be improved with the IAV model or similar device. 
 
___ 6.  My duties require me to determine the mission impact of cyber incidents.   
 
___ 7.  I am part of a team that determines the mission impact of cyber incidents.   
 
___ 8.  I have no need of knowing mission impact resulting from cyber incidents.  
  
___ 9.  I (my team) frequently scramble to determine the impact of cyber incidents. 
 
___ 10.  I (my team) frequently make estimation in determining the impact of cyber incidents. 
 
 
II. This portion of the survey contains questions related to the qualitative information asset 
factors of the Information Asset Valuation (IAV) methodology.  Using the scale below, 
indicate the extent that you agree with the following statements. Use the blank space at the 
beginning of each statement to record the number of your choice. 
 
 
1 
Never 
 
2 
Seldom 
 
3 
Occasionally 
 
4 
Frequently 
 
5 
Almost Always 
 
 
___ 11.  I would use the factor “Accessibility” as characterized by the question, “how easily can I 
get use of this asset?” 
 
___ 12.  I would use the factor “Availability” as characterized by the questions, “how often can I 
get use of this asset?”   
 
___ 13.  I would use the factor “Confidentiality” as characterized by the question, “would 
exposure be detrimental?” 
 
___ 14.  I would use the factor “Contextual” as characterized by the questions, “who and how the 
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 asset is used?” 
 
___ 15.  I would use the factor “Essentiality” as characterized by the questions, “can I function 
without it?” 
 
___ 16.  I would use the factor “Integrity” as characterized by the question, “can the 
communicated information be corrupted?” 
 
___ 17.  I would use the factor “Non-repudiation” as characterized by the questions, “is this really 
the originator?” 
  
___ 18.  I would use the factor “Substitutability” characterized by the questions, “is there an 
alternative source?” 
 
___ 19.  I would use the factor “Temporal” as characterized by the questions, “how does the 
importance of the information change as a function of time?” 
 
 
 
III. Information Asset Valuation (IAV) methodology factor scale.  Using the scale below, 
indicate the extent that you agree with the following statements. Use the blank space at the 
beginning of each statement to record the number of your choice. 
 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
2 
Disagree 
 
3 
Slightly 
Disagree 
 
4 
Neutral 
 
5 
Slightly Agree 
 
6 
Agree 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
___ 20. It is easy to understand how the factor scale is utilized. 
 
___ 21. The factor scale is appropriate and flexible enough for my duties. 
 
___ 22. My duties require a scale with more levels for greater specificity.  
 
___ 23. The factor scale as an alert system of mission criticality will be easy to use.  
 
___ 24. It is difficult to distinguish among the levels. 
 
___ 25. My duties require a simpler factor scale. 
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Part IV.  Work Experiences.  Please look at the following duty titles/areas and rate 
those that apply to your current position.  If a duty title/area does not apply, there is no 
need to assign a number to it.   
1 
Almost Never 
2 
Once in a while 
3 
Occasionally
4 
Usually 
5 
Quite Often 
6 
Almost Always 
 
Since arriving at your job, to what degree have you been involved with or worked with… 
 
I.  AOC, CAOC, JAOC.  
Deal with cyber incidents ___ 
Analyze cyber incidents ___ 
Assign mission impact of incidents ___ 
Work cyber incidents for Operations ___ 
Work cyber incidents for Communications ___ 
Work cyber incidents for other ___ 
    ________________________________________________________________ 
II. Battle Staff, Command Post, Similar 
Deal with cyber incidents ___ 
Analyze cyber incidents ___ 
Assign mission impact of incidents ___ 
Work cyber incidents for Operations ___ 
Work cyber incidents for Communications ___ 
Work cyber incidents for other ___ 
 
 
58.  Please write any comments below that you would like to provide about your AFFAM class 
and / or your work experiences (use additional paper if necessary):  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete the survey! Please put your survey into the pre-
addressed return envelope and put it in official mail, or place it in a separate envelope and mail to: 
CIMIA Project  
AFIT/ENV 
2950 Hobson Way 
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433
 
 
 Appendix C: Glossary 
ABA – American Bar Association 
ABAJD – American Bar Association Judicial Division 
AOC – Air Operations Center 
AF – Air Force 
AFRL – Air Force Research Laboratory 
AFForm – Air Force form 
AFI – Air Force Instruction 
AFMAN – Air Force Manual 
AFMCL - Air Force Master Capabilities List 
AFNOSC – Air Force Network Operations and Security Center 
AFPAM – Air Force Pamphlet 
ARC – Archival Research Catalog 
ASDT – Air Support Data Terminal 
AUTL – Army Universal Task List 
BCE – Base Civil Engineering 
BCE-WOM – Base Civil Engineering Work Order Management 
CAOC – Combined Air Operations Center 
CAPM – Capital Asset Pricing Model or alternate Capital Asset Pricing Model 
CCIR – Commander’s Critical Information Requirement 
CERCLA – Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act of 
1980 
CDT – Central Dispatch Terminal 
CIL – Critical Information Listing 
CIP – Critical Information Program 
CJCS – Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 
CJCSM – Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 
CNSI – Classified National Security Information 
DA – Damage Assessment 
DHS – Department of Homeland Security 
DMAIR – Damage-to-Mission assessment/Impact Reporting 
DoD – Department of Defense 
DoDD – Department of Defense Directive 
DSS – Decision Support Software 
EES – Enlisted Evaluation System 
EO – Executive Order 
EPR – Enlisted Performance Reporting 
EPS – Engineering Performance Standards 
FBA – Federal Bar Association 
FASB – Financial Accounting Standards Board 
FMV – Fair Market Value 
FV – Fair Value 
GAAP – Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
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GASB – Government Accounting Standards Board 
HSAS – Homeland Security Advisory System 
HTTM – Helpdesk Trouble Ticket Management 
IGBV – International Glossary of Business Valuation 
InfoA – Information Asset 
IAI – Information Asset Identification 
IAMM – Information Asset Mission Mapping 
IAV – Information Asset Valuation 
IP – Intellectual Property 
IRS – Internal Revenue Service 
IT – Internet Technology 
JAOC – Joint Air Operations Center 
JCS – Joint Chiefs of Staff 
JFC – Joint Force Commander 
LEO – Law Enforcement Officer 
MAJCOM – Major Command (United States Air Force) 
MDT – Mobile Datalink Terminal 
NARA – National Archives and Records Administration 
NCC – Network Control Center 
NOSC – Network Operations and Security Center 
NSA – National Security Agency 
OPSEC –Operational Security 
ORM – Operational Risk Management 
OWG – Operations Working Group 
PFW – Performance Feedback Worksheet 
PME – Professional Military Education 
PMO – Program Management Office 
QMC – Qualitative Measurement Categories 
R&D – Research and Development 
R&DV – Research and Development Value 
SCDb – State Criminal Database 
SCL – Sales Contact Listing 
SDT – State Dispatch Terminal 
SME – Subject Matter Expert 
TR – Treasury Regulation 
UCC – Uniform Commercial Code 
UJTL – Universal Joint Task List 
UNTL – Universal Naval Task List 
USC – United States Code 
U.S.C. – United States Code 
USPTO – United States Patent and Trademark Office 
VDb – Vehicle Database 
WACC – Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
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